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Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1
(05-908)
Ruling Below: (Parents Involved in Community Schools, Petitioner v. Seattle School District
No. 1, et al., 426 F.3d 1162 (9h Cir. C.A. 2005), cert granted 126 S. Ct. 2351, 74 U.S.L.W. 3676
[2006]).
A group of parents with children in defendant's school district challenged the constitutionality of
the school district's plan which selected children by race to enter public high schools to maintain
a balanced racial proportion in that school. The parents claimed that by denying students
enrollment in a public high school on the basis of race this plan violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Washington Civil Rights Act by
discriminating on the basis of race. The Ninth Circuit Court upheld the plan by applying Grutter
v Bollinger, finding that racial diversity in high schools is a compelling interest that justifies the
use of race, and that the plan was narrowly tailored to accomplish the goal of racially balanced
high schools.
Questions Presented: 1. Whether the rationale for promoting student body viewpoint diversity
in institutions of higher education, as discussed in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), should be limited and not extended into the context of
elementary and secondary public schools.
2. Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for
admission to public high schools?
3. May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally permits a student to
attend any high school of her choosing, deny a child admission to her chosen school solely
because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance in particular schools, or does
such racial balancing violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, Petitioner,
Plaintiff-counter-defendant - Appellant
V.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, et al.
Defendants-counter-claimants - Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided June 21, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
FISHER, Circuit Judge: open choice, noncompetitive, public high
school assignment plan crafted by Seattle
This appeal requires us to consider whether School District Number 1 (the "District")
the use of an integration tiebreaker in the violates the federal Constitution's Equal
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Protection Clause. Our review is guided by
the principles articulated in the Supreme
Court's recent decisions regarding
affirmative action in higher education,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US. 306, 156 L.
Ed. 2d 304, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), and
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 US. 244, 156 L. Ed.
2d 257, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003), and the
Court's directive that "context matters when
reviewing race-based governmental action
under the Equal Protection Clause."
Grutter, 539 US. at 327. We conclude that
the District has a compelling interest in
securing the educational and social benefits
of racial (and ethnic) diversity, and in
ameliorating racial isolation or concentration
in its high schools by ensuring that its
assignments do not simply replicate Seattle's
segregated housing patterns. We also
conclude that the District's Plan is narrowly
tailored to meet the District's compelling
interests.
I. Background
A. Seattle Public Schools: A Historical
Perspective
. . . Seattle is a diverse community.
Approximately 70 percent of its residents
are white, and 30 percent are nonwhite.
Seattle public school enrollment breaks
down nearly inversely, with approximately
40 percent white and 60 percent nonwhite
students.
The District operates 10 four-year public
high schools. . . . For over 40 years, the
District has made efforts to attain and
maintain desegregated schools and avoid the
racial isolation or concentration that would
ensue if school assignments replicated
Seattle's segregated housing patterns. Since
the 1960s, while courts around the country
ordered intransigent school districts to
desegregate, Seattle's School Board
voluntarily explored measures designed to
end de facto segregation in the schools and
provide all of the District's students with
access to diverse and equal educational
opportunities.
[The court recounted the history that led to
the adoption of the current student
assignment plan.]
The Board adopted the current open choice
plan (the "Plan") for the 1998-99 school
year. Under the Plan, students entering the
ninth grade may select any high school in
the District. They are assigned, where
possible, to the school they list as their first
choice. If too many students choose the
same school as their first choice, resulting in
"oversubscription," the District assigns
students to each oversubscribed school
based on a series of tiebreakers. If a student
is not admitted to his or her first choice
school as a result of the tiebreakers, the
District tries to assign the student to his or
her second choice school, and so on.
Students not assigned to one of their chosen
schools are assigned to the closest school
with space available; students who list more
choices are less likely to receive one of these
"mandatory" assignments. The most recent
version of the Plan, which the School Board
reviews annually, is for the 2001-02 school
year and is the subject of this litigation.
B. The Plan
. . . For the academic year 2000-01,
approximately 82 percent of students
selected one of the oversubscribed schools
as their first choice, while only about 18
percent picked one of the undersubscribed
high schools as their first choice. Only when
oversubscription occurs does the District
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become involved in the assignment process.
If a high school is oversubscribed, all
students applying for ninth grade are
admitted according to a series of four
tiebreakers, applied in the following order:
First, students who have a sibling attending
that school are admitted. In any given
oversubscribed school, the sibling tiebreaker
accounts for somewhere between 15 to 20
percent of the admissions to the ninth grade
class.
Second, if an oversubscribed high school is
racially imbalanced-meaning that the racial
make up of its student body differs by more
than 15 percent from the racial make up of
the students of the Seattle public schools as
a whole-and if the sibling preference does
not bring the oversubscribed high school
within plus or minus 15 percent of the
District's demographics, the race-based
tiebreaker is "triggered" and the race of the
applying student is considered. (For the
purposes of the race-based tiebreaker, a
student is deemed to be of the race specified
in his or her registration materials.) Thus, if
a school has more than 75 percent nonwhite
students (i.e., more than 15 percent above
the overall 60 percent nonwhite student
population) and less than 25 percent white
students, or when it has less than 45 percent
nonwhite students (i.e., more than 15
percent below the overall 60 percent
nonwhite student population) and more than
55 percent white students, the school is
considered racially imbalanced.
The race-based tiebreaker is applied to both
white and non-white students. . . . These
assignments accounted for about 10 percent
of admissions to Seattle's high schools as a
whole. That is, of the approximately 3,000
incoming students entering Seattle high
schools in the 2000-01 school year,
approximately 300 were assigned to an
oversubscribed high school based on the
race-based tiebreaker.
In addition to changing the trigger point for
the 2001-02 school year to plus or minus 15
percent, the District also developed a
"thermostat," whereby the tiebreaker is
applied to the entering ninth grade student
population only until it comes within the 15
percent plus or minus variance. Once that
point is reached, the District "turns-off' the
race-based tiebreaker, and there is no further
consideration of a student's race in the
assignment process. The tiebreaker does not
apply, and race is not considered, for
students entering a high school after the
ninth grade (e.g., by transfer).
The District estimates that without the race-
based tiebreaker, the nonwhite populations
of the 2000-01 ninth grade class at Franklin
would have been 79.2 percent, at Hale 30.5
percent, at Ballard 33 percent and at
Roosevelt 41.1 percent. Using the race-
based tiebreaker, the actual nonwhite
populations of the ninth grade classes at the
same schools respectively were 59.5
percent, 40.6 percent, 54.2 percent and 55.3
percent.
II. Discussion
A. Strict Scrutiny
We review racial classifications under the
strict scrutiny standard, which requires that
the policy in question be narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest. The
strict scrutiny standard is not "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." Adarand, 515 US.
at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"Although all governmental uses of race are
subject to strict scrutiny, not all are
invalidated by it." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-
27. . . . In evaluating the District's Plan
under strict scrutiny, we also bear in mind
the Court's directive that "context matters
when reviewing race-based governmental
action under the Equal Protection Clause."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
The District's interests fit into two broad
categories: (1) the District seeks the
affirmative educational and social benefits
that flow from racial diversity; and (2) the
District seeks to avoid the harms resulting
from racially concentrated or isolated
schools.
1. Educational and Social Benefits that Flow
from Diversity
The District has established that racial
diversity produces a number of compelling
educational and social benefits in secondary
education. First, the District presented
expert testimony that in racially diverse
schools, "both white and minority students
experienced improved critical thinking
skills-the ability to both understand and
challenge views which are different from
their own."
Second, the District demonstrated the
socialization and citizenship advantages of
racially diverse schools. School officials,
relying on their experience as teachers and
administrators, and the District's expert all
explained these benefits on the record....
The District's interests in the educational
and social benefits of diversity are similar to
those of a law school as articulated in
Grutter. The contextual differences between
public high schools and universities,
however, make the District's interests
compelling in a similar but also significantly
different manner.
The Supreme Court in Grutter noted the
importance of higher education in
"preparing students for work and
citizenship." 539 U.S. at 331. For a number
of reasons, public secondary schools have an
equal if not more important role in this
preparation. First, underlying the history of
desegregation in this country is a legal
regime that recognizes the principle that
public secondary education serves a unique
and vital socialization function in our
democratic society....
Second, although one hopes that all students
who graduate from Seattle's public schools
would have the opportunity to attend
institutions of higher learning if they so
desire, a substantial number of Seattle's
public high school graduates do not attend
college. For these students, their public high
school educational experience will be their
sole opportunity to reap the benefits of a
diverse learning environment....
Third, the public school context involves
students who, because they are younger and
more impressionable, are more amenable to
the benefits of diversity. See Comfort, 418
F.3d at 15-16 ("In fact, there is significant
evidence in the record that the benefits of a
racially diverse school are more compelling
at younger ages."); Comfort v. Lynn School
Committee, 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 356 (D.
Mass. 2003).
The dissent insists that racial diversity in a
public high school is not a compelling
interest, arguing that Grutter endorsed a law
school's compelling interest in diversity
only in some broader or more holistic sense.
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To attain this broader interest, the dissent
contends, the District may only consider
race along with other attributes such as
socioeconomic status, ability to speak
multiple languages or extracurricular talents.
We read Grutter, however, to recognize that
racial diversity, not some proxy for it, is
valuable in and of itself.
In short, the District has demonstrated that it
has a compelling interest in the educational
and social benefits of racial diversity similar
to those articulated by the Supreme Court in
Grutter as well as the additional compelling
educational and social benefits of such
diversity unique to the public secondary
school context.
2. Avoiding the Harms Resulting from
Racially Concentrated or Isolated Schools
The District's interest in achieving the
affirmative benefits of a racially diverse
educational environment has a flip side:
avoiding racially concentrated or isolated
schools. . . . Research regarding
desegregation has found that racially
concentrated or isolated schools are
characterized by much higher levels of
poverty, lower average test scores, lower
levels of student achievement, with less-
qualified teachers and fewer advanced
courses - "with few exceptions, separate
schools are still unequal schools." . . .
Accordingly, the District's Plan strives to
ensure that patterns of residential
segregation are not replicated in the
District's school assignments. Although
Parents make much of the fact that "Seattle
has never operated a segregated school
system," and allege that "this is not a school
desegregation case," each court to review
the matter has concluded that because of
Seattle's housing patterns, high schools in
Seattle would be highly segregated absent
race conscious measures....
2. Absence of Quotas
In Grutter, the Court approved the law
school's plan, in part, because it did not
institute a quota, whereby a fixed number of
slots are reserved exclusively for minority
groups, thereby insulating members of those
groups from competition with other
candidates. Although the law school's plan
did not seek to admit a set number or
percentage of minority students, during the
height of the admission's season, the law
school would consult "daily reports" that
kept track of the racial composition of the
incoming class. The Court held that this
attention to numbers did not transform the
law school plan into a quota, but instead
demonstrated that the law school sought to
enroll a critical mass of minority students in
order "to realize the educational benefits of a
diverse student body." Id. Similarly, we
conclude that the District's 15 percent plus
or minus variance is not a quota because it
does not reserve a fixed number of slots for
students based on their race, but instead it
seeks to enroll a critical mass of white and
nonwhite students in its oversubscribed
schools in order to realize its compelling
interests.
a. No fixed number of slots
The District's race-based tiebreaker does not
set aside a fixed number of slots for
nonwhite or white students in any of the
District's schools. The tiebreaker is used
only so long as there are members of the
underrepresented race in the applicant pool
for a particular oversubscribed school. If the
number of students of that race who have
applied to that school is exhausted, no
further action is taken, even if the 15 percent
variance has not been satisfied. That is, if
the applicant pool has been exhausted, no
students are required or recruited to attend a
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particular high school in order to bring it
within the 15 percent plus or minus range
for that year.
Moreover, the number of white and
nonwhite students in the high schools is
flexible and varies from school to school
and from year to year. This variance in the
number of nonwhite and white students
throughout the District's high schools is
because, under the Plan, assignments are
based on students' and parents' preferences.
The tiebreakers come into play in the
assignment process only when a school is
oversubscribed....
b. Critical mass
[The court discussed the District's goal of
having a critical mass of both white and
nonwhite students enrolled.]
Accordingly, we conclude that the District's
15 percent plus or minus trigger point tied to
the demographics of the Seattle school
population is not a quota. It is a context-
specific, flexible measurement of racial
diversity designed to attain and maintain a
critical mass of white and nonwhite students
in Seattle's public high schools.
3. Necessity of the Plan and Race-Neutral
Alternatives
Narrow tailoring also requires us to consider
the necessity of the race-based plan or
policy in question and whether there are
equally effective, race-neutral alternatives.
a. Necessity of the Plan
The District argues that the compelling
interests that it seeks are directly served by
the race-based tiebreaker. The tiebreaker
allows the District to balance students' and
parents' choices among high schools with its
broader compelling interests-achieving the
educational and social benefits of diversity
and the benefits specific to the secondary
school context, and discouraging a return to
enrollment patterns based on Seattle's
racially segregated housing pattern.
i. Need for race-based tiebreaker
[The court discussed and rejected possible
non race-based solutions and concluded that
the race-based plan was necessary]
Although the District has the burden of
demonstrating that its Plan is narrowly
tailored, see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270, it need
not "exhaust[] every conceivable race-
neutral alternative." Grutter, 539 U.S. at
339.
In sum, the District made a good faith effort
to consider feasible race-neutral alternatives
and permissibly rejected them in favor of a
system involving a sibling preference, a
race-based tiebreaker and a proximity
preference. Over the long history of the
District's efforts to achieve desegregated
schools, it has experimented with many
alternatives, including magnet and other
special-interest programs, which it continues
to employ, and race-conscious districting.
But when a racially diverse school system is
the goal (or racial concentration or isolation
is the problem), there is no more effective
means than a consideration of race to
achieve the solution. . . . The logic is self-
evident: When racial diversity is a principal
element of the school district's compelling
interest, then a narrowly tailored plan may
explicitly take race into account.
441
4. Undue Harm
A narrowly tailored plan ensures that no
member of any racial group is unduly
harmed. Parents argue that every student
who is denied his or her choice of schools
because of the integration tiebreaker suffers
a constitutionally significant burden. We
agree with the Supreme Court of
Washington, however, in its assessment that
the District's Plan imposes a minimal burden
that is shared equally by all of the District's
students. Indeed, public schools, unlike
universities, have a tradition of compulsory
assignment.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the race-
based tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit
one race or group to the detriment of
another. At some schools, white students are
given preference over nonwhite students,
and, at other schools, nonwhite students are
given preference over white students....
In sum, because (1) the District is entitled to
assign all students to any of its schools, (2)
no student is entitled to attend any specific
school and (3) the tiebreaker does not
uniformly benefit any race or group of
individuals to the detriment of another, the
tiebreaker does not unduly harm any
students in the District.
5. Sunset Provision
A narrowly tailored plan must be limited not
only in scope, but also in time. Grutter, 539
US. at 342. The Court held in Grutter that
this durational requirement can be met by
"periodic reviews to determine whether
racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity." Id. The
District's Plan includes such reviews....
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
Plan adopted by the Seattle School District
for high school assignments is constitutional
and the use of the race-based tiebreaker is
narrowly tailored to achieve the District's
compelling interests. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
CONCURING:
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:
The Seattle plan.. .is not meant to oppress
minorities, nor does it have that effect. No
race is turned away from government
service or services. The plan does not
segregate the races; to the contrary, it seeks
to promote integration. There is no attempt
to give members of particular races political
power based on skin color. There is no
competition between the races, and no race
is given a preference over another. That a
student is denied the school of his choice
may be disappointing, but it carries no racial
stigma and says nothing at all about that
individual's aptitude or ability. The program
does use race as a criterion, but only to
ensure that the population of each public
school roughly reflects the city's racial
composition.
Because the Seattle plan carries none of the
baggage the Supreme Court has found
objectionable in cases where it has applied
strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring, I would
consider the plan under a rational basis
standard of review. By rational basis, I don't
mean the standard applied to economic
regulations, where courts shut their eyes to
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reality or even invent justifications for
upholding government programs, but robust
and realistic rational basis review, where
courts consider the actual reasons for the
plan in light of the real-world circumstances
that gave rise to it.
Under this standard, I have no trouble
finding the Seattle plan constitutional.
Through their elected officials, the people of
Seattle have adopted a plan that emphasizes
school choice, yet tempers such choice
somewhat in order to ensure that the schools
reflect the city's population. Such stirring of
the melting pot strikes me as eminently
sensible.
When the Supreme Court does review the
Seattle plan, or one like it, I hope the
justices will give serious thought to
bypassing strict-and almost always
deadly- scrutiny, and adopt something more
akin to rational basis review. Not only does
a plan that promotes the mixing of races
deserve support rather than suspicion and
hostility from the judiciary, but there is
much to be said for returning primacy on
matters of educational policy to local
officials....
When it comes to a plan such as this-a plan
that gives the American melting pot a
healthy stir without benefiting or burdening
any particular group-I would leave the
decision to those much closer to the affected
community, who have the power to reverse
or modify the policy should it prove
unworkable. It is on this basis that I would
affirm the judgment of the district court.
DISSENTING: BEA, Circuit Judge, with
whom Circuit Judges KLEINFELD,
TALLMAN and CALLAHAN join:
I agree with the majority that the District's
use of the racial tiebreaker is a racial
classification, and all racial classifications
are subject to "strict scrutiny" review under
the Equal Protection Clause. Yet the
majority conceives of strict scrutiny as some
type of relaxed, deferential standard of
review. I view it differently.
The right to equal protection provides a
liberty; it represents freedom from
government coercion based upon racial
classifications. Thus, under strict scrutiny,
all racial classifications by the government,
regardless of purported motivation, are
"inherently suspect," and "presumptively
invalid,". They are permissible only where
the government proves their use is
"narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests."
It follows, then, that the government carries
the burden of proving that its use of racial
classifications satisfies strict scrutiny.
Despite this formidable standard of review,
the majority does not hesitate to endorse the
District's use of the racial tiebreaker. Rather
than recognizing the protections of the
individual against governmental racial
classifications, the majority instead endorses
a rigid racial governmental grouping of high
school students for the purpose of attaining
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racial balance in the schools. For the reasons
expressed below, I do not share in the
majority's confidence that such a plan is
constitutionally permissible.
III.
The District contends it has a valid
compelling governmental interest in using
racial balancing to achieve "the educational
and social benefits of racial . . . diversity"
within its high schools and avoid "racially
concentrated" schools. The District argues
its interest will enhance student discussion
of racial issues in high school and will foster
cross-racial socialization and understanding,
both in school and later in the students' lives.
The [U.S. Supreme] Court has endorsed two
race-based compelling governmental
interests in the public education context.
First, the Court has allowed racial
classifications to remedy past racial
imbalances in schools resulting from past de
jure segregation. Second, the Court has
allowed undergraduate and graduate
universities to consider race as part of an
overall, flexible assessment of an
individual's characteristics to attain student
body diversity.
Besides those two valid compelling
interests, the Court has struck down every
other asserted race-based compelling interest
that has come before it.
Thus, we face a landscape littered with
rejected asserted "compelling interests"
requiring race-based determinations, but
with two exceptions still standing. The first
exception is inapplicable here because the
Seattle schools have never been de jure
segregated.
The second exception is also inapplicable,
albeit not so directly acknowledged. At oral
argument, the District conceded that it is not
asserting the Grutter "diversity" interest; the
majority recognizes this in stating the
District's asserted interest is "significantly
different" in some ways from the interest
asserted in Grutter. Nonetheless, the
majority concludes those differences are
inconsequential because of the different
"context" between high schools and
universities, and the District's asserted
interest is a compelling governmental
interest in its own right.
Not so. The very differences between the
Grutter "diversity" interest and the District's
asserted interest illustrate why the latter
violates the Equal Protection Clause as
opposed to the former. The Grutter
"diversity" interest focuses upon the
individual, of which race plays a part, but
not the whole. The District's asserted
interest, however, focuses only upon race,
running afoul of equal protection's focus
upon the individual.
B.
In Grutter and Gratz, the Court made clear
that the valid compelling interest in
"diversity" does not translate into a valid
compelling interest in "racial diversity." The
"diversity" interest is not an interest in
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic
groups . . . . Rather, the diversity that
furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element. Grutter, 539 US. at 324-
25 (emphasis added).
The Grutter "diversity" interest focuses
upon the individual, which can include the
applicant's race, but also includes other
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factors, such as the applicant's family
background, her parent's educational history,
whether she is fluent in other languages,
whether she has overcome adversity or
hardship, or whether she has unique athletic
or artistic talents. See 539 U.S. at 338. Such
a focus is consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, which protects the
individual, not groups.
But here, the District's operation of the
racial tiebreaker does not consider the
applicant as an individual. To the contrary,
the racial tiebreaker considers only whether
the student is white or nonwhite. While the
Grutter "diversity" interest pursues genuine
diversity in the student body (of which race
is only a single "plus" factor), the District
pursues an interest which considers only
racial diversity, i.e., a predefined grouping
of races in the District's schools. Such an
interest is not a valid compelling interest; it
is simple racial balancing, forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause.
But here, the District's concept of racial
diversity is a predetermined, defined ratio of
white and nonwhite children. The racial
tiebreaker works to exclude white students
from schools that have a 50-55% white
student body (depending on the tiebreaker
trigger used in a particular year), and works
to exclude nonwhite students from schools
with a 70-75% nonwhite student body
(depending on the tiebreaker trigger used).
Thus, the District's concept of racial
diversity does not permit a school with a
student body that is too white, or a school
with a student body that is too nonwhite.
The District argues its concept of racial
diversity is necessary to foster classroom
discussion and cross-racial socialization.
That argument, however, is based on the
stereotype that all white children express
traditional white viewpoints and exhibit
traditional white mannerisms; all nonwhite
children express opposite nonwhite
viewpoints and exhibit nonwhite
mannerisms, and thereby white and
nonwhite children will better understand
each other. Yet there is nothing in the racial
tiebreaker to ensure such viewpoints and
mannerisms are represented within the
preferred student body ratio. As noted in
Grutter, the only way to achieve diverse
viewpoints and mannerisms is to look at the
individual student....
Besides the District's reliance on racial
stereotypes, there is good reason
categorically to forbid racial balancing. The
process of classifying children in groups of
color, rather than viewing them as
individuals, encourages "notions of racial
inferiority" in both white and nonwhite
children and incites racial hostility. Indeed,
those risks are particularly great here
because of the blunt nature of the racial
tiebreaker. The District's racial grouping of
students, either as white or nonwhite,
assumes that each minority student is the
same, regardless whether he is African-
American, Asian-American, Latino, or
Native American; the only difference noted
by the District is that the minority student is
not white....
Unlike a voluntary decision by parents to
expose their children to individuals of
different races or background, the District
classifies each student by skin color and
excludes certain students from particular
schools-solely on the basis of race-to
ensure those schools remain racially
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balanced. Even if well intentioned, the
District's use of racial classifications in such
a stark and compulsory fashion risks
perpetuating the same racial divisions which
have plagued this country since its founding
The District's asserted interest may be
supported by noble goals. But the
stereotypes on which it is based, and the
risks that it presents, make that interest far
from compelling.
C.
The sociological evidence presented by the
District, relied upon strongly by the
majority, does not change my view. The
majority discusses much of the evidence that
supports the District's position that racially
balanced schools foster cross-racial
socialization and understanding in school
and later in the students' lives. Yet the
majority puts aside the other evidence
suggesting there is no definitive agreement
as to the beneficial effects of racial balance
in K-12 schools, that the benefits attributed
to racially balanced schools are often weak,
and that any benefits do not always have a
direct correlation to racial balance....
But despite the inconsistencies in the
sociological evidence and the vivid risks of
the District's asserted interest, the majority
implicitly defers to the District's position.
Grutter took a similar approach,
emphasizing that its endorsement of the
"diversity" interest relied in large part upon
deference to the educational judgment of the
Michigan Law School.
Yet perhaps to steal a line from the majority,
the "context" here is different. We are not
faced with a university's "academic
freedom," which arises from "a
constitutional dimension, grounded in the
First Amendment, of educational
autonomy," and which includes the freedom
to select its student body. Id. We instead
consider a public high school's admissions
plan which admits or excludes students from
particular schools solely on the basis of their
race. For several reasons, we should not
defer to such a plan.
First, other than for race-conscious
university admissions based on holistic
diversity, deference to a government actor is
inconsistent with strict scrutiny.
Moreover, there is a crucial difference
between the "robust exchange of ideas"
theory referenced in Grutter and the
District's claim that its interest "brings
different viewpoints and experiences to
classroom discussions and thereby enhances
the educational process." The District
applies the racial tiebreaker only to entering
ninth-grade students. It is self-evident that
classroom discussion plays a significantly
more vital role in universities with their
typical dialectic or Socratic teaching
method, than in ninth-grade high school
courses with their typical didactic or rote
teaching method.
Last, the District's claim that its asserted
interest helps to foster cross-racial
socialization and understanding later in the
students' lives is a sociological judgment
outside the expertise of the District's
educators....
Strict scrutiny cannot remain strict if we
defer to judgments not even within the
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particular expertise or observation of the
party being scrutinized. Hence, deference
is not due to the District regarding the
benefits the District contends are attributable
to its claimed interest.
Iv
Even if the District's asserted interest were a
compelling governmental interest, the means
used by the District must still be narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. See Grutter,
539 US. at 333....
pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant,
and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily
according them the same weight." Id. at
334.
Here, the racial tiebreaker works to admit or
exclude high school students from certain
oversubscribed schools solely on the basis of
their skin color. No other consideration
affects the operation of the racial tiebreaker.
[The dissent notes the program categorizes
students broadly as "white" or "nonwhite"
and suggests this is not narrowly tailored.]
A.
The first narrow-tailoring factor requires the
District to engage in an individualized
consideration of each applicant's
characteristics and qualifications. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. At 337....
Yet the majority concludes that
individualized consideration of each
applicant is irrelevant here "because of the
contextual differences between institutions
of higher learning and public high schools."
Majority op. at 36. I could not disagree
more. By removing consideration of the
individual from the narrow tailoring
analysis, the majority threatens to read the
Equal Protection Clause out of the
Constitution. It is the very nature of equal
protection to require individualized
consideration when the government uses
racial classifications: "the Fourteenth
Amendment "protects persons, not groups."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand,
515 U.S. at 227) (emphasis in original). ...
Individualized consideration of an applicant
does not require an admissions program to
be oblivious to race; the program may
consider race, but in doing so, it must
remain "flexible enough to consider all
B.
The second narrow-tailoring factor prohibits
the use of quotas based upon race. Grutter,
539 U.S. at 334. A quota is defined as "a
program in which a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities are reserved
exclusively for certain minority groups.
Quotas impose a fixed number or percentage
which must be attained, or which cannot be
exceeded." Id. at 335.
Here, when a District school is
oversubscribed and "integration positive"-
i.e., the white or nonwhite student body of
the school deviates by plus or minus 10% or
15% (depending on the school year) of the
preferred 40% white/60% nonwhite ratio-
the District uses the racial tiebreaker to
admit students whose presence will move
the overall student body closer to the
preferred ratio. ...
By its nature, the tiebreaker aims for a rigid,
predetermined ratio of white and nonwhite
students, and thus operates to reach "a fixed
number or percentage." (emphasis supplied).
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Gratz specifically rejected such a plan as not
narrowly tailored. See 539 US. at 270.
Yet the majority argues no quota exists here
because the racial tiebreaker "does not set
aside a fixed number of slots for nonwhite or
white students," nor is the 10 or 15%
variance always satisfied (generally because
there are insufficient numbers of white or
nonwhite students needed to balance the
school). Majority op. at 46. With respect, the
majority misses the point. A quota does not
become less of a quota because there are an
insufficient number of whites or nonwhites
to fill the preselected spots. The District
created a quota when it established the
predetermined, preferred ratio of white and
nonwhite students....
C.
The third narrow-tailoring factor requires
the District to have engaged in a "serious,
good-faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives." See id at 339. The
majority concludes the District made such
an effort. For several reasons, I disagree.
First, the District's superintendent flatly
admitted the District did not engage in a
serious, good-faith consideration of race-
neutral alternatives.
The record supports this concession. The
District never asked its demographer to
conduct any analysis regarding the effect of
using a race-neutral lottery. The District also
never asked its demographer to conduct any
analysis regarding a diversity program with
non-racial indicia such as a student's
eligibility for free lunch or the students's
socioeconomic background. [The dissent
goes on to discuss various other alternatives
the District did not consider.]
D.
The fourth narrow-tailoring factor requires
that the District's use of the racial tiebreaker
"must not unduly burden individuals who
are not members of the favored racial and
ethnic groups." The majority adjusts this
test slightly to consider "any racial group,"
rather than just members of the disfavored
group. Because the racial tiebreaker
disadvantages both white and nonwhite
children, I agree that the modification is
valid. But unlike the majority, I conclude the
District's operation of the racial tiebreaker
fails this factor as well.
The racial tiebreaker unduly burdens
thirteen- and fourteen-year-old school
children by (1) depriving them of their
choice of school, and (2) imposing on them
tedious cross-town commutes, solely upon
the basis of their race.
Yet the majority discounts the burdens
imposed by the racial tiebreaker, concluding
that (1) the "minimal burden" of the
tiebreaker is shared equally among white
and nonwhite students; (2) no student is
entitled to attend any specific school in any
event; and (3) the tiebreaker does not
uniformly benefit one race over the other
because the tiebreaker operates against both
whites and nonwhites. Regarding the first
point, the U.S. Supreme Court has long
rejected the notion that a racial classification
which burdens races equally is any less
objectionable under the Equal Protection
Clause....
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Second, I think I have already disposed of
the majority's argument that no student is
entitled to attend any specific District
school. The students and parents clearly
value some of the District's schools above
the others, and limiting access to those
higher quality schools on the basis of race is
just the same as any other preferential racial
classification.
Third, I agree the tiebreaker does not
uniformly benefit one race over the other
and can exclude both white and nonwhite
students from the preferred schools. Yet that
does not lessen the injury of being subject to
a racial classification. Equal protection is an
individual right, and whenever the District
tells one student, whether white or nonwhite,
he or she cannot attend a particular school
on the basis of race, that action works an
injury of constitutional proportion.
E.
The fifth and final narrow-tailoring factor
requires the District's use of the racial
tiebreaker to "be limited in time," and "have
a logical end point." See Grutter, 539 U.S. at
342.
Citing Grutter, the majority contends the
racial tiebreaker satisfies this factor because
"this durational requirement can be met by
periodic reviews to determine whether racial
preferences are still necessary to achieve
student body diversity," and the District
engages in such periodic reviews. Majority
op. at 65. Yet citing Grutter in full shows
that "the durational requirement can be met
by sunset provisions in race-conscious
admissions policies and periodic reviews to
determine whether racial preferences are
still necessary to achieve student body
diversity." 539 U.S. at 342 (emphasis
added). Periodic reviews are not enough;
there must be some "durational
requirement," some "logical end point," to
the racial classifications.
V.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, other
courts have concluded that a school district's
use of a racial tiebreaker in search of racial
balance in the student body passes muster
under the Equal Protection Clause. I
respectfully disagree. The District's use of
the racial tiebreaker to achieve racial
balance in its high schools infringes upon
each student's right to equal protection and
tramples upon the unique and valuable
nature of each individual. We are not
different because of our skin color; we are
different because each one of us is unique.
That uniqueness incorporates our opinions,
our background, our religion (or lack
thereof), our thought, and our color. Grutter
attempted to strike a balance between the
individual protections of equal protection
and being conscious of race even when
looking at the individual. The District's use
of the racial tiebreaker, however, attempts
no such balance; it instead classifies each
ninth-grade student solely by race. Because
of that, I must conclude such a program
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
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Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education
(05-915)
Ruling Below: (McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs 330 F. Supp. 2D 834, upheld by
McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126
S. Ct. 2351, 74 U.S.L.W. 3676 [2006]).
The Jefferson County Public Schools system voluntarily adopted a plan to assign students to its
schools based on a number of factors, including race, in order to maintain a certain proportion of
black students at each school. Plaintiffs are the parents of students in the Jefferson County public
schools who claim that the school student assignment plan violates the rights of their children
under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution to be admitted to a school
without consideration of their race. Because the plan did not conflict with Grutter v Bollinger
and was narrowly tailored, the court allowed the school board to take race into account. The
selection process for the school board's traditional magnet schools was found to not be narrowly
tailored, and was ordered to be revised.
Question Presented: 1. Should Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 268 (1978) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) be overturned and/or misapplied by the Respondent, the Jefferson County Board of
Education to use race as the sole factor to assign students to the regular (non-traditional) schools
in the Jefferson County Public Schools?
2. Whether the race-conscious Student Assignment Plan with mechanical and inflexible quota
systems of not less than 15% nor greater than 50% of African American students without
individually or holistic review of any student, meets the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of
the use of race which is a compelling interest narrowly tailored with strict scrutiny.
3. Did the District Court abuse and/or exceed its remedial judicial authority in maintaining
desegregative attractiveness in the Public Schools of Jefferson County, Kentucky?
David McFARLAND, Parent and Next Friend of Stephen and Daniel McFarland, et al.,
Plaintiffs
V.
JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendants
United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky
Decided June 29, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
JOHN G. HEYBURN II, Chief Judge: maintained an integrated school system
under a 1975 federal court decree. After
For twenty-five years, the Jefferson County release from that decree four years ago, the
Public Schools ("JCPS" or "the Board") JCPS elected to continue its integrated
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schools through a managed choice plan that
includes broad racial guidelines ("the 2001
Plan"). This case arises because some
students and their parents say that the
Board's student assignment plan violates
their rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.
I. SUMMARY
... For guidance, the Court has focused on
the divided opinions of the Supreme Court
in two recent cases: Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 156 L. Ed. 2d 257, 123 S. Ct.
2411 (2003). The first of these opinions
upheld race-conscious admissions policies at
the University of Michigan Law School; the
latter struck down different policies at the
University of Michigan's College of
Literature, Science and the Arts. These two
cases set out the requirement that any use of
race in a higher education admissions plan
must further a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to
meet that interest. The Court considered
these principles in the slightly different
context of an elementary and secondary
school student assignment plan.
JCPS meets the compelling interest
requirement because it has articulated some
of the same reasons for integrated public
schools that the Supreme Court upheld in
Grutter. Moreover, the Board has described
other compelling interests and benefits of
integrated schools, such as improved student
education and community support for public
schools, that were not relevant in the law
school context but are relevant to public
elementary and secondary schools.
In most respects, the JCPS student
assignment plan also meets the narrow
tailoring requirement. Its broad racial
guidelines do not constitute a quota. The
Board avoids the use of race in predominant
and unnecessary ways that unduly harm
members of a particular racial group. The
Board also uses other race-neutral means,
such as geographic boundaries, special
programs and student choice, to achieve
racial integration.
The student assignment process for the
traditional schools is distinct from that
employed at all other programs and schools.
In that process, JCPS separates students into
racial categories in a manner that appears
completely unnecessary to accomplish its
objectives. To the extent the 2001 Plan
incorporates these procedures, the Court
concludes that it violates the Equal
Protection Clause. The Board may continue
to administer the 2001 Plan in every respect
in all of its schools, with the exception of its
use of racial categories in the traditional
school assignment process.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs all have children who attend or
have attended Jefferson County public
schools and have participated in the student
assignment process. Each, in different ways,
is dissatisfied with the procedure or result of
his or her child's assignment to a Jefferson
County public school. Plaintiffs seek to
enjoin the use of racial guidelines under the
2001 Plan, including the use of racial
categories in the traditional school
assignment process. This Court has stated
that, because the student assignment plan
applies at all grade levels in all school
settings in the Jefferson County schools, any
ruling would necessarily apply to the entire
school system.
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A.
JCPS is the 28th largest public school
system in the United States. Its district
boundaries mirror those of the new
Metropolitan Louisville which is now the
16th largest city in the nation. In 2003-2004,
about 97,000 students were enrolled in
JCPS: approximately 5,000 in preschool
programs; 42,500 in elementary schools;
21,650 in middle schools; 24,750 in high
schools; 2,100 in alternative schools; and
about 1,000 in special schools and special
education centers. The racial profile of
students subject to the 2001 Plan is about
34% Black and 66% White.
B.
This case and its legal predecessors are
inseparable from JCPS's ongoing
commitment to racial integration within its
individual schools. One can find the
complete legal and historical background of
this case in Hampton I, 72 F. Supp. 2d 753,
754-67 (W.D. Ky. 1999). [The court
described this case. A 1975 court order
directed the Board to implement a
desegregation plan. In 1996 the Board
revised its student assignment plan and
students and parents filed a lawsuit alleging
the students were denied admission to a high
school because of their race. The court
concluded that the original desegregation
order was still in place, and the plaintiffs
moved to dissolve the decree.]
In June 2000, this Court dissolved the 1975
desegregation decree, ordered JCPS to cease
using racial quotas at Central High School,
and ordered JCPS to complete any
reevaluation and redesign of the admissions
procedures in other magnet schools before
the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year.
Hampton II, 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 377-81
(W.D. Ky. 2000).
To comply with the Court's order, the Board
ended its use of racial quotas at Central High
School and at three other magnet schools .
The Board determined that the Court's order
did not address the use of race at magnet
traditional schools. In April 2001, after
considering public feedback from opinion
surveys and community meetings, the Board
adopted the 2001 Plan.
III. THE 2001 STUDENT ASSIGNMENT
PLAN
. . . The 2001 Plan contains three basic
organizing principles: (1) management of
broad racial guidelines, (2) creation of
school boundaries or "resides" areas and
elementary school clusters, and (3)
maximization of student choice through
magnet schools, magnet traditional schools,
magnet and optional programs, open
enrollment and transfers. Using these
principles, JCPS provides a form of
managed choice in student assignment for its
students individually and for the system as a
whole.
A.
The racial guidelines broadly influence the
overall student assignment plan. This is not
surprising since one of the Board's current
stated goals under the 2001 Plan is to
provide "substantially uniform educational
resources to all students" and to teach basic
skills and critical thinking skills "in a
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racially integrated environment." To
accomplish these objectives, the 2001 Plan
requires each school to seek a Black student
enrollment of at least 15% and no more than
50%. This reflects a broad range equally
above and below Black student enrollment
systemwide.
Prior to any consideration of a student's
race, a myriad of other factors, such as place
of residence, school capacity, program
popularity, random draw and the nature of
the student's choices, will have a more
significant effect on school assignment. The
guidelines mostly influence student
assignment in subtle and indirect ways. For
instance, where the racial composition of an
entire school lies near either end of the racial
guidelines, the application of any student for
open enrollment, transfer or even to a
magnet program could be affected. In a
specific case, a student's race, whether Black
or White, could determine whether that
student receives his or her first, second, third
or fourth choice of school.
For the most part, the guidelines provide
administrators with the authority to
facilitate, negotiate and collaborate with
principals and staff to maintain schools
within the 15-50% range.
B.
Geographic boundaries greatly influence
student assignments. Each JCPS school,
[except the traditional program schools,]
has a designated geographic attendance area,
which is called its "resides area." Each
student is assigned a "resides school" based
upon the residence address of his or her
parent(s) or guardian. In 2002-2003, 57.5%
of all students attended their resides school.
At the elementary school level, all non-
magnet elementary schools are grouped into
twelve clusters. The elementary schools in a
cluster, which includes a student's resides
school, are designated as "cluster resides
schools" for that student. Racial
demographics have influenced the
boundaries for contiguous and non-
contiguous resides areas and the
composition of some elementary school
clusters. Elementary schools are clustered so
that combined attendance zones, assuming
normal voluntary choices, will produce at
each school student populations somewhere
within the racial guidelines.
Each non-magnet middle and high school
has its own resides area. There are no
clusters at those levels. Apart from age,
graduation from previous grade and
residence, no selection criteria govern
admission of any student to his or her
resides school or a school within his or her
cluster. The geographic boundaries of
resides areas and cluster schools determine
most school assignments.
C.
Student choice may be the most significant
element of the 2001 Plan. In addition to a
choice of geographic location, JCPS offers
students the choice of numerous and varied
specialized schools and programs.
[The court discussed various
programs students can choose
Jefferson district]
magnet
in the
An important part of student choice is the
ability of virtually any student to apply for
open enrollment (high school freshmen
only) or transfer to any non-magnet school.
The process for each is similar. After the
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initial assignment process is complete, any
student may apply for transfer to any non-
magnet school. Rising freshmen may apply
for open enrollment to any non-magnet high
school. If the student is accepted, the
receiving school becomes the student's
resides school. In each case, the receiving
school makes the original decision to accept
or reject the applicant. The number of
students actually requesting transfer or open
enrollment is quite small.
D.
School geographic boundaries and student
choice interact to create a huge array of
choices and flexibility within the assignment
process. [The court described various
educational options available to students in
the district].
The admissions process for non-traditional
magnet schools, magnet programs and
optional programs at all grade levels is
relatively straightforward. Admissions
decisions for the four non-traditional magnet
schools are based upon: (1) objective criteria
established by the school or program, such
as a survey and/or essay, recommendations
by adults, a work sample or audition,
attendance data, course grades and CATS
and/or standardized test scores; (2) available
space in the school or program; and (3) for
students applying to Brown, position on a
computer-generated random draw list and
residence within a zip code that will make
the student body representative of the entire
county. In addition to objective criteria and
program capacity, the racial guidelines are a
factor in admission to all the other magnet
and optional programs. Admission to one of
the middle school Math, Science and
Technology Programs is also based upon
position on a computer-generated random
draw list.
E.
Traditional schools have a more complex
admissions process, which combines
elements of student choice, program and
school capacity, geographic boundaries,
pure chance, broad racial guidelines and the
use of racial categories to separate
applicants. Some Plaintiffs initiated this
litigation because they object to JCPS's use
of the racial guidelines in general, and the
use of racial categories in particular, in the
traditional school admissions process.
JCPS first developed traditional programs
for the 1976-1977 school year. Traditional
schools offer the same comprehensive
curriculum offered by every other non-
magnet school. These schools emphasize
basic skills in a highly structured
educational environment, discipline and
dress codes, learning with daily follow-up
assignments, and concepts of courtesy,
patriotism, morality and respect for others. .
The traditional program is offered as the
sole structure at nine schools: four
elementary, three middle and two high
schools. In addition, JCPS offers the
traditional program at two resides
elementary schools, Foster and Maupin. In
2002-2003, about 9.3% of all JCPS students
were enrolled in the traditional program.
1.
Place of residence and position on the
random draw lists are the primary factors for
entry into the traditional program. With the
exception of the programs at Foster and
Maupin, which are open to students
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districtwide, each traditional elementary and
middle school has its own geographic zone.
Students attend the traditional school in their
geographic zone. After initial acceptance,
the so-called "pipeline" becomes the
dominant influence in traditional school
assignment. The "pipeline" guarantees each
current traditional school student a spot in
the next grade level without submitting a
new application. The "pipeline" enlarges in
each grade, thus creating openings for new
applicants to the traditional program.
Middle schools are larger than elementary
schools. Consequently, the "pipeline"
increases by about 450 students at the sixth
grade level and by sixty students at the
seventh grade level. About 800 students
graduate from the three traditional middle
schools. These students can state a
preference to attend either Butler or Male [. .
.which] have available space for 946 ninth
graders, 446 at Butler and 500 at Male....
Butler typically has about 200 openings for
students outside the traditional school
"pipeline." Consequently, students not in the
"pipeline" may apply for Butler. Their
applications are considered to the extent
space is available.
Students who are not accepted to a
traditional school have other opportunities to
join the "pipeline." For instance, a student
may elect to apply to the traditional
programs at Foster or Maupin. . . . [The
court notes that most of the plaintiffs did not
reapply when denied admission or did not
apply to the traditional program.]
2.
The racial guidelines also apply to the
traditional schools. The process for
employing the guidelines, however, is
significantly different from the process as it
is applied to all other schools. Applicants are
separated and randomly sorted into four lists
at each grade level: Black Male, Black
Female, White Male and White Female.
The principal has discretion to draw
candidates from different lists in order to
stay within the racial guidelines for the
entire school student population. The racial
guidelines apply to the entire school, not per
grade. Generally speaking, depending on
how many spaces are available for new
applicants, a principal will first take a
certain number of applicants from each
list-for instance, the first ten names on
each list-and notify the parents. If the
parent declines to enroll the child in that
school, the principal can now move to the
next name on one of the four lists, using his
or her discretion as to which list to choose
from. If all of the parents accept, depending
upon space availability, the selection process
may be complete or may require selection of
a few more students. The Office of
Demographics gives final approval on a
principal's selections to ensure that the
school is within the racial guidelines.
A principal may not deviate from the order
in which the names appear on the lists. If a
principal has chosen all the names on a
given list, he or she is not permitted to
recruit additional applicants for that
race/gender category. Similarly, if few or no
Black students apply to a traditional school,
a principal would be limited to admitting
only those Black students who apply at that
time. JCPS, however, makes a concerted
effort through the Parent Assistance Center
and the Department of Student Assignment
to ensure adequate Black student
participation in the traditional program.
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IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
[The court establishes that strict scrutiny is
the proper standard of review for racial
classifications]
Most recently, in Grutter and Gratz, the
Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed strict
scrutiny for review of racial classifications
in higher education admissions programs.
V. JCPS HAS
COMPELLING
MAINTAINING
SCHOOLS
ESTABLISHED A
INTEREST IN
INTEGRATED
Strict scrutiny means that racial
classifications must further a compelling
governmental interest and must be narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. ...
The Supreme Court has said that universities
and graduate schools may state a compelling
interest in obtaining "the educational
benefits of a diverse student body." Id. at
328. The Board's interests articulated here
overlap with those of the Michigan Law
School at the individual student level. In
addition, in its statement of interests, the
Board has articulated broader concerns in
the different context of public elementary
and secondary education. The different
context "matters" because, under the Equal
Protection Clause, "not every decision
influenced by race is equally objectionable
and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a
framework for carefully examining the
importance and the sincerity of the reasons
advanced by the governmental
decisionmaker for the use of race in that
particular context." Id. at 327. No particular
interest, however, is categorically
compelling. The interest asserted must be
examined and approved in each case in light
of the particular context in which it is
asserted.
To give all students the benefits of an
education in a racially integrated school and
to maintain community commitment to the
entire school system precisely express the
Board's own vision of Brown's promise. The
benefits the JCPS hopes to achieve go to the
heart of its educational mission: (1) a better
academic education for all students; (2)
better appreciation of our political and
cultural heritage for all students; (3) more
competitive and attractive public schools;
and (4) broader community support for all
JCPS schools. Mem. Op., at 1-2.
Whether an asserted interest is truly
compelling is revealed only by assessing the
objective validity of the goal, its importance
to JCPS and the sincerity of JCPS's interest.
For the reasons that follow, the Court has no
doubt that Defendants have proven that their
interest in having integrated schools is
compelling by any definition.
A.
Traditionally, Americans consider the
education of their children a matter of
intense personal and local concern. Not
surprisingly, over many years and in a
variety of circumstances, the Supreme Court
has strongly endorsed the role and
importance of local elected school boards as
they craft educational policies for their
communities. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467, 489-90, 118 L. Ed. 2d 108, 112 S. Ct.
1430 (1992); Wash. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 458 U.S. 457, 481-82, 73 L. Ed. 2d 896,
102 S. Ct. 3187 (1982). The historical
importance of the deference accorded to
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local school boards goes to the very heart of
our democratic form of government. It is
conceptually different-though perhaps
more accepted-than the deference
discussed in Grutter and Bakke.
Democratically elected school boards across
the country are struggling to improve our
schools and the education of children in
them and to retain the public support of their
communities. The Court's deference to
JCPS's efforts here is neither absolute nor
determinative.
B.
Now removed from the mandate of a federal
court decree, the Board has made its choice.
This Court must consider the importance
and validity of that choice.
Integrated schools, better academic
performance, appreciation for our diverse
heritage and stronger, more competitive
public schools are consistent with central
values and themes of American culture.
Access to equal and integrated schools has
been an important national ethic ever since
Brown v. Board of Education established
what Richard Kluger described as "nothing
short of a reconsecration of American
ideals." What Kluger and others have
articulated is that Brown's symbolic, moral
and now historic significance may now far
exceed its strictly legal importance. Alluding
to that very point, this Court has said that
"Brown and its progeny established a moral
imperative to eradicate racial injustice in the
public schools." Hampton II, 102 F. Supp.
2d at 379. Congress recently affirmed the
value of racial integration and interaction by
its enactment of the No Child Left Behind
Act and by the statements contained in that
legislation. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has reiterated
that "education . . . is the very foundation of
good citizenship." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331
(quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
For the majority in Grutter, cross-racial
understanding and racial tolerance,
preparation for a diverse workplace and
training of the nation's future leaders were
"substantial" benefits of diversity in higher
education. Id. at 330-32. Like institutions of
higher education, elementary and secondary
schools are "pivotal to 'sustaining our
political and cultural heritage' with a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of
society." Id. at 331 (quoting Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 221, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 102 S.
Ct. 2382 (1982)). For that reason, these
same benefits accrue to students in racially
integrated public schools. Several JCPS
witnesses testified that, in a racially
integrated learning environment, students
learn tolerance towards others from different
races, develop relationships across racial
lines and relinquish racial stereotypes. These
values transcend their experiences in public
school and carry over to their relationships
in college and in the workplace. As a result,
these students are better prepared for jobs in
a diverse workplace and exhibit greater
social and intellectual maturity with their
peers in the classroom and at their job.
These benefits that the Board seeks from an
integrated school system are precisely those
articulated and approved of in Grutter. The
Court finds that the benefits of racial
tolerance and understanding are equally as
"important and laudable" in public
elementary and secondary education as in
higher education. Id. at 330.
Other benefits the Board seeks are quite
457
different from those articulated in Grutter.
Nevertheless, they seem equally compelling.
The Board believes that integration has
produced educational benefits for students
of all races. Over the past twenty-five years,
White and Black students in JCPS have
progressed by every measure. In Hampton
II, this Court found that "the Board is
convinced that integrated schools provide a
better educational setting for all its students;
[and] that concentrations of poverty which
may arise in neighborhood schools are much
more likely to adversely affect black
students than whites." 102 F. Supp. 2d at
371 n.30. The evidence presented in this and
earlier cases "seems to suggest that African-
American student achievement has
improved substantially" during the past
twenty-five years. Id. at 365 n.12. Indeed,
one of Defendants' experts testified that
racial integration benefits Black students
substantially in terms of academic
achievement. The Court cannot be certain to
what extent the policy of an integrated
school system has contributed to these
successes. Opinions surely vary on this
issue. The Court certainly need not resolve
this ongoing debate. But, the Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact any particular
preference of educational policy. As a
matter of evidence, however, this Court can
find that the Board has valid reasons for
believing that its student assignment policies
may aid student performance.
The Board also believes that school
integration benefits the system as a whole by
creating a system of roughly equal
components, not one urban system and
another suburban system, not one rich and
another poor, not one Black and another
White. It creates a perception, as well as the
potential reality, of one community of
roughly equal schools. Student choice and
integrated schools, the Board believes,
invest parents and students alike with a
sense of participation and a positive stake in
their schools and the school system as a
whole. This is vital to JCPS because, in a
very real sense, it competes for students with
many types of private and parochial schools
throughout Jefferson County. In recent
years, it has competed very successfully....
The evidence on each of these points
demonstrates that maintaining an integrated
system may help the Board to achieve its
goals for individual students and the system
as a whole. The Court concludes, therefore,
that the Board's policy of integrated schools
is both important and valid.
VI. THE 2001 PLAN IS NARROWLY
TAILORED IN MOST RESPECTS
Even to achieve a compelling purpose, the
Board may use race only by means that are
"specifically and narrowly framed to
accomplish that purpose." Grutter, 539 U.S.
At 333. . . . To be narrowly tailored, the
Board's use of race must "'fit' this
compelling goal so closely that there is little
or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype." J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. at 493. The Court's narrow
tailoring inquiry must be carefully
"calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by
the use of race" in this case. Grutter, 539
U.S. at 334. Consequently, the Court will
evaluate whether the 2001 Plan is narrowly
tailored, or is a proper "fit," in light of the
factual and analytical differences between
this case and the admissions programs
reviewed in Grutter and Gratz.
The complexity of these legal issues and the
absence of judicial unanimity mean that
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fundamental truths about narrow tailoring
are difficult to discern. The Grutter and
Gratz opinions reveal a starkly divided court
that determines equal protection
jurisprudence by a shifting coalition of
views in a given context or case. The Court
must proceed carefully. For that reason, the
Court will not accord even limited deference
to the Board's implementation of its goals.
With these principles in mind, in order to
determine whether the 2001 Plan is narrowly
tailored, the Court will evaluate the four
primary factors that the Supreme Court
considered in Grutter: (1) whether the 2001
Plan amounts to a quota that seeks a fixed
number of desirable minority students and
insulates one group of applicants from
another, (2) whether the applicant is
afforded individualized review, (3) whether
the 2001 Plan "unduly harm[s] members of
any racial group," and (4) whether JCPS has
given "serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives" to
achieve its goals. Together, these factors
constitute the "fit" that is so important to the
narrow tailoring analysis. Id. at 333. The
Court's analysis will focus upon elements of
the 2001 Plan that govern assignment to
non-traditional schools. In a separate
section, the Court will consider whether the
student assignment process for traditional
schools is narrowly tailored.
A.
The most important narrow tailoring issue,
and Plaintiffs' primary argument, concerns
whether the 2001 Plan operates as a racial
quota. "Properly understood, a 'quota' is a
program in which a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities are 'reserved
exclusively for certain minority groups."' Id.
at 335. The Supreme Court said that a race-
conscious admissions program cannot use a
quota system because it would almost
always violate the narrow tailoring
requirement. Id. at 334-35. As the Supreme
Court also wisely noted, however, "'some
attention to numbers,' without more, does
not transform a flexible admissions system
into a rigid quota." Id. at 336 (quoting
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323). Common sense and
the Supreme Court suggest that any strict or
de facto racial quota has a couple of known
characteristics: it has a precise target, and it
insulates some applicants from competition
with other applicants. The Court concludes
that, for the most part, the 2001 Plan's use of
the racial guidelines lacks these attributes.
1.
By definition, a quota must present a
relatively precise target. While this would
appear clear enough, everyone appears to
have different ways of applying this
definition to a given set of facts.
The 2001 Plan's racial guidelines for all
schools present a quite flexible and broad
target range. The Board's goal is to achieve a
racial mix of between 15% and 50% Black
students at each school. That the actual
percentage of Black students at individual
schools ranges between 20.1% and 50.4%
demonstrates the extent of the Board's
flexibility in achieving its goals. Even
within this broad range, the Court finds a
wide dispersal among the percentages of
Black students in JCPS schools. For
instance, 62 out of 87 elementary schools,
17 of 23 middle schools, and 15 of 20 high
schools have a racial mix of over 40% or
under 30% Black students. In other words,
only about 30% of all schools show a racial
mix within even five percent of either side
of the systemwide average. This represents a
widely dispersed range in Black students
among JCPS schools rather than a precise
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target.
Everyone seems to have an opinion about
the meaning of statistics. In Grutter, for
instance, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
battled over statistics and what constituted a
quota. Justice O'Connor called the Michigan
Law School's percentages of minority
students, which varied between 13.5% and
20.1%, "a range inconsistent with a quota."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336. Justice Kennedy,
however, concluded that the percentage of
minority law students fell in a much tighter
range that he called a quota. He viewed race
as almost "an automatic factor" that made
the law school's "numerical goals
indistinguishable from quotas." Id. at 389
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). He said that "the
narrow fluctuation band [among rates of
admission for Black applicants] raises an
inference that the Law School subverted
individual determination, and strict scrutiny
requires the Law School to overcome the
inference." Id. at 390-91. Justice Kennedy
cited Amherst College, which admitted
between about 8.5% (81 out of 950 offers)
and 13.2% (125 out of 950 offers) minority
applicants over a ten-year period, as an
example of a range not suggestive of a
quota. Id. In our case, one finds neither an
automatic assignment nor a "narrow band"
of percentages of Black students among
JCPS schools. Indeed, the range in the
percentage of Black students among all
JCPS schools is much broader than the
range in minority admissions at either
Amherst College or Michigan Law School.
This wide fluctuation suggests a lesser use
of race and the absence of a specific target.
Finally, even a cursory review of assignment
data reveals that neither Black students nor
White students are guaranteed assignment to
a particular school. Too many race-neutral
factors affect assignment for that to be true.
A quota also insulates "each category of
applicants with certain desired qualifications
from competition with all other applicants."
Id. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315
(Powell, J.)). In other words, it "put[s]
members of those groups on separate
admissions tracks." Id. Except for traditional
school assignment, all JCPS students are
subject to the same criteria within the 2001
Plan. Criteria such as residence, student
choice and random lottery are significant
assignment factors for every student. No
JCPS student is insulated from competition
with all other students, and no student is
placed on a separate admissions track.
It is constitutionally permissible to set racial
goals to achieve truly compelling interests.
It is impermissible, however, to seek that
racial goal so assiduously and precisely that
it amounts to a quota. JCPS's conduct
resembles the former because it has set "a
permissible goal .. . requir[ing] only a good-
faith effort . . . to come within a range
demarcated by the goal itself." Id. at 335 .
The broad range in the guidelines shows that
the Board does not operate a de facto quota
that imposes or arrives at a "fixed number or
percentage which must be attained." Id.
(quoting Sheet Metal Workers Int'1 Ass'n,
478 U.S. at 495). Thus, the evidence simply
does not support the conclusion that the
broad racial guidelines actually mask a
tighter range, create a de facto quota or
insulate one group of applicants from
competition with another group.
B.
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor noted that the
law school's "highly individualized" review
of applications meant that the admissions
process did not contain "mechanical" or
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2.
"predetermined diversity bonuses." Id. at
337. For her, the law school's approach was
more nuanced than that of the undergraduate
admissions program because the law school
conducted a meaningful review of the
individual candidate's application. In fact, in
her Gratz concurrence joined by Justice
Breyer, she noted the absence of
individualized attention when finding the
undergraduate program's use of race in its
admissions policy impermissible. Gratz, 539
U.S. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The switch that Justices O'Connor and
Breyer made between Grutter and Gratz
reveals a potential fault line in the narrow
tailoring analysis: the presence or absence of
individualized review. Consequently, the
Court must determine whether the 2001 Plan
incorporates some sufficient form of
individualized attention in the assignment
process. The Court concludes that it does.
"Highly individualized, holistic review" of
each applicant ensures that "each applicant
is evaluated as an individual and not in a
way that makes an applicant's race or
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her
application." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. . . .
Under those circumstances, race is "one of
many factors" to consider and may be used
as a permissible "tipping" factor in deciding
a particular student's placement. Id. at 339
(citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316).
One must analyze the 2001 Plan in its totally
different context. Unlike the law school,
JCPS does not deny anyone the benefits of
an education. . . . Rather than excluding
applicants, the Board's goal is to create more
equal school communities for educating all
students. But, like the law school, the JCPS
assignment process focuses a great deal of
attention upon the individual characteristics
of a student's application, such as place of
residence and student choice of school or
program. It is individualized attention of a
different kind in a different context than the
Supreme Court found in Grutter.
In significant ways, the 2001 Plan actually
operates like the "plus" system of which the
Supreme Court has spoken so approvingly.
Id. at 335 (citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 638, 94 L. Ed. 2d 615, 107 S.
Ct. 1442 (1987)). Many factors determine
student assignment, including address,
student choice, lottery placement, and, at the
margins, the racial guidelines. But, race is
simply one possible factor among many,
acting only occasionally as a permissible
"tipping" factor in most of the JCPS
assignment process. The Supreme Court has
said this narrow use of race is permissible
given a compelling reason. Specifically,
Justice Powell stated in Bakke that "when
the [Harvard] Committee on Admissions
reviews the large middle group of applicants
who are 'admissible' and deemed capable of
doing good work in their courses, the race of
an applicant may tip the balance in his favor.
... 438 U.S. 265, 316, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 98
S. Ct. 2733 (1978) (quoting from amicus
brief regarding aspects of Harvard
admissions policy). In Grutter, the Supreme
Court echoed these sentiments, stating that
situations where race makes a difference in
admissions could happen in "any plan that
uses race as one of many factors," including
the Michigan Law School plan. 539 U.S. at
339.
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court
concludes that the 2001 Plan allows for the
consideration of several factors, including
race. Moreover, except as to traditional
schools, the appropriate consideration of
individual factors within the assignment
context ensures that race does not become
"the defining feature" of a student's
application.
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C.
Another factor in the narrow tailoring
analysis is that the Board's use of race does
not "unduly harm members of any racial
group." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. This is
neither a new nor surprising concept. Some
twenty-six years ago, Justice Powell
referenced the same distinction between
denial of admission to a selective graduate
school and the assignment of a student to an
alternative but appropriate public school.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 300 n.39. His observation
seems applicable here.
The workplace, marketplace, and higher
education cases are poor models for most
elementary and secondary public school
education precisely because they always
involve vertical choices-one person is
hired, promoted,
contract, or gains
when JCPS assigns
elementary, middle,
assignment has no
effects. This is s
concludes that as
elementary schools,
another imposes no
benefit. The same e
each school, so assig
is basically fung
consequence, most
that there is no indi
receives
admission.
students to
or high
qualitative
) because
a valuable
Ordinarily,
a particular
school, the
or 'vertical'
the Court
between two regular
assignment to one or
burden and confers no
ducation is offered at
nment to one or another
ible. As a logical
courts have concluded
vidual right to attend a
specific school in a district or to attend a
neighborhood school. As among basically
equal schools, the use of race would not be a
'preference.' As among basically equal
schools, therefore, JCPS's policy is not one
of 'affirmative action.'
102 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (citations and
footnotes omitted). The difference between
the use of race in graduate school
admissions and the JCPS student assignment
plan results from the vastly different concept
of each system. The law school admissions
program excludes many applicants because
of its goal of creating an elite community.
The JCPS policy of creating communities of
equal and integrated schools for everyone
excludes no one from those communities.
Consequently, when the Board makes a
student assignment among its equal and
integrated schools, it neither denies anyone a
benefit nor imposes a wrongful burden.
... [T]he Board uses race in a limited way
to achieve benefits for all students through
its integrated schools.
D.
"Narrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral
alternative." Id. For instance, the Board
could accomplish its objective through some
form of an assignment lottery covering the
entire school system. Such a system,
however, would require a "dramatic
sacrifice" in student choice, geographic
convenience and program specialization. Id.
at 340. Moreover, it could only be achieved
at a huge financial cost. This is not required.
In every area of school assignment except
the traditional schools, the Board has
undertaken considerable effort to achieve its
goals without the overt use of race in student
assignments. It encourages students of all
races to exercise choices. It recruits Black
and White students for academic programs
that promote educational improvement and
enhance school integration. As a
consequence, the Board's goal of an
integrated school system is achieved
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primarily through alternative measures that
are educationally laudable and restrained in
the use of race. The Court concludes that,
throughout most of the assignment process,
the Board sufficiently considered and used
alternatives, which either were race-neutral
or made minimal use of race, to meet narrow
tailoring requirements.
E.
In summary, except for the traditional
school assignment process, which will be
discussed separately, the 2001 Plan is a
proper "fit" because it is sufficiently flexible
to determine school assignments for all
students by a host of factors, such as
residence, student choice, capacity, school
and program popularity, pure chance and
race....
The 2001 Plan also "fits" its intended
objectives because it does not unduly harm
other students. The Plan works so that most
students attend a school of their choice.
Because all schools have similar funding,
offer similar academic programs and
comprise more similar ranges of students
than possible in neighborhood schools, an
assignment to one school over another does
not cause constitutional harm to any student.
Except as to traditional schools, the Court
cannot see that JCPS has any other workable
race-neutral alternatives for accomplishing
its compelling objective.
VII. THE TRADITIONAL
ASSIGNMENT PROCESS
NARROWLY TAILORED
SCHOOL
IS NOT
The sole exception to the Court's narrow
tailoring inquiry concerns the traditional
school assignment process. Traditional
school enrollment amounts to a small
portion of the overall student census. The
assignment process for those schools has
features that make it distinct from other
aspects of the 2001 Plan and present
particularly difficult constitutional
questions. In the end, the Court finds that the
use of race in the traditional school
assignment process is not narrowly tailored.
In some respects, the traditional schools are
no different than others throughout JCPS.
Traditional schools have the same
curriculum, financial resources and student
discipline regulations as nearly every other
school. They offer a distinct atmosphere for
the same educational curriculum available at
most other schools. The broad racial
guidelines cover traditional schools in the
same manner as every other school. Were
the traditional school assignment process to
function under the same broad racial
guidelines and operational principles as
previously discussed, it would be entirely
permissible.
The traditional school assignment process,
however, differs in two respects that have
constitutional significance: (1) the
assignment process puts Black and White
applicants on separate assignment tracks,
and (2) its use of the separate lists appears to
be completely unnecessary to accomplish
the Board's goal.
The significance of separating traditional
school applicants into explicit racial
categories is that students are placed on
separate assignment tracks where race
becomes "the defining feature of his or her
application." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 337. .
. . The assignment process insulates one
group of applicants from the randomness of
choice and "competition" with other
applicants. The use of categories, therefore,
makes race the "defining feature" rather than
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merely the "tipping" factor. In this Court's
view, the Supreme Court would likely find
these racial categories highly suspect.
An even more troublesome aspect of these
racial classifications is that they appear
entirely unnecessary to achieve the Board's
stated goal of racial integration. The Court
has compared data regarding the racial
make-up of the applicant pools in the last
two academic years with the racial make-up
of the student populations in individual
traditional schools at the same time. Overall,
the percentage of Black applicants each year
to a particular traditional school rather
closely approximated the percentage of
Black students in that school's population.
Under the general law of probabilities, if
applicants were selected off of one random
draw list, the ratio of Black to White
students in the applicant pool at a particular
school would be reflected in the ratio of
Black to White students in the pool of
admitted students and, consequently, in the
school's student population at large. More
importantly, given the current numbers of
Black students applying to traditional
schools, the laws of probability predict that
each school would fall within the racial
guidelines. This is true even at Greathouse
Elementary and Johnson Middle where
numbers of Black applicants hover at either
end of the guidelines. This evidence
suggests that the use of racial categories is
completely unnecessary.
JCPS says that separate racial lists are
necessary to maintain solid levels of Black
student participation in traditional schools.
JCPS fears that, without the lists, Black
students would be admitted in fewer
numbers, racial isolation would result, and
Black students would be discouraged from
applying in the future. Even if this
speculation should prove true, the Board has
much less intrusive and more precisely
targeted means at its disposal to maintain
present levels of Black student participation
in the traditional program or to rectify
decreased future participation at certain
schools. JCPS can enhance its recruitment
efforts for White and Black students at
various traditional schools. It can redraw
traditional school boundaries (at least at the
elementary and middle school levels) to
increase the chances of attracting more
Black students from neighborhoods in which
Blacks reside and increase outreach to Black
families. As the 2001 Plan provides, the
Board could then use race as a "tipping"
factor if necessary to achieve its compelling
goals.
The Court must conclude that the initial
separation of traditional school applicants
into racial categories makes race a defining
feature of the student's application and is
entirely unnecessary to accomplish the
Board's stated objective of racial integration.
This use of race in the 2001 Plan therefore is
not narrowly tailored. By revising the 2001
Plan in a manner consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion, the Board may
maintain its current assignment process.
Although the Court has found that the use of
racial categories under the 2001 Plan
violates Plaintiffs' rights under the Equal
Protection Clause, their children are not
entitled to admission to the school of their
choice. . . . While the Court will enjoin the
use of the racial categories in the traditional
school assignment process, equity does not
require that Plaintiffs' children be admitted
to the school of their choice in the upcoming
school year.
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"Justices to Hear Cases of Race-Conscious School Placements"
Washington Post
June 6, 2006
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court announced yesterday
that it will rule on the race-conscious
assignment of students to public schools, in
a pair of cases that could produce some of
the most important decisions on school
integration since the busing battles of the
1960s and '70s.
The court agreed to hear arguments in
separate lawsuits by white parents in Seattle
and Jefferson County, Ky., which
encompasses Louisville, who say each
public school system unconstitutionally
discriminates based on skin color. The
jurisdictions' programs differ, but each seeks
to maintain racial balance with the help of
numerical targets for minority enrollment.
Although the court has addressed race-
conscious admissions for diversity in higher
education, upholding them on a 5 to 4 vote
in 2003, this would be the first time it has
addressed the "diversity rationale" as it
affects the country's 48 million public
elementary and secondary school students. It
will also be the first race-related
constitutional case for President Bush's two
appointees, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.
The court's decision to take the cases was
something of a surprise, since all three
federal appeals courts to rule since 2003
sided with the school systems. The court
usually intervenes to settle lower-court
conflicts.
Six months ago, before Alito replaced
Sandra Day O'Connor, who wrote the 2003
opinion, the court declined to hear the
challenge of a parent in Lynn, Mass., to a
race-conscious plan.
"It's bad news for desegregation advocates,"
said Goodwin Liu, a Clinton administration
education official who teaches constitutional
law at the University of California at
Berkeley. "It looks like the more
conservative justices see they have a fifth
vote to reverse these cases."
But lawyers for the Seattle and Louisville
parents argued there was a circuit split
because the post-2003 lower-court rulings
clashed with three pre-2003 rulings against
race-conscious policies.
Sharon Browne, principal attorney of the
Pacific Legal Foundation, which supports
the parents' lawsuits, said she "was pleased
that the Court has decided to hear these
cases. Together, these cases could put an end
to schools using race as a factor to decide
where children can attend public school."
Yesterday's decision returns the court to an
area of American life that it revolutionized
in 1954 with Brown v. Board Education-
and the lower-court desegregation orders,
including busing in many cities, that flowed
from that decision.
In the intervening years, however, direct
court supervision of public school racial
composition has generally lapsed, and
schools face student demographics
determined not only by the country's historic
black-white divide, but also by immigration
from around the world.
Embracing diversity not as a legal
requirement but as an educational objective,
school districts frequently offer alternatives
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to geographical assignment, including
school choice and magnet school options.
But these, in turn, can result in competition
for spots at the most-sought-after schools.
"The decision and the opinions will be
impactful," said Francisco Negron, general
counsel of the National School Boards
Association, which has supported the school
districts in the lower courts. "We're in the
post-integration era. Many desegregation
lawsuits filed in the '70s have come to a
natural ending point. . . . Schools are trying
to implement policies that recognize the
need for diversity."
Seattle and Louisville say their plans are
consistent with the Supreme Court's 2003
ruling-which allowed universities to
consider race as one of many factors when
assembling diverse colleges and graduate
schools.
They say their use of race is necessary to
meet compelling educational goals, and
accounts for a modest number of school
assignments.
But the plaintiffs argue that school officials
have gone beyond what the court permitted
in 2003, because they ultimately rely on
fixed numerical targets for assigning
students.
Each system adopted its plan voluntarily, but
against the backdrop of different social and
legal histories.
In Louisville, the 97,000-student public
school population is 34 percent black, with
the rest predominantly white. In 1973, a
federal court ruled that it was officially, and
unlawfully, segregated. This led to court-
ordered busing from 1975 to 1984. The
system remained under court supervision
until 2000.
The current Louisville plan says that all
schools, including magnets, must have a
minimum black enrollment of 15 percent
and a maximum of 50 percent.
The only exceptions are for pre-
kindergarten, kindergarten, alternative and
special schools-and four magnet schools
covered by a federal judge's ruling barring
the use of race to allocate educational
opportunities not widely available.
Parent Crystal D. Meredith, however, argues
that the plan cost her son admission to the
school in his neighborhood. In Seattle,
which has substantial Asian and Hispanic
populations as well as large numbers of
whites and African Americans, no court has
ever found the 47,000-student school system
guilty of official segregation. Instead, the
school board says that diversity is a key
educational value and that segregated
housing patterns must be changed.
The city began busing in 1977 but stopped
in 1988. Under an "Open Choice" plan
adopted in 1998, the goal was to have
schools close to the city's overall racial
composition: 60 percent minority, 40
percent white. Children can attend any
school. At schools where demand for spaces
exceeds supply, however, siblings of current
students have priority-and an "integration
tiebreaker" favors students whose race
would tip a school toward 60-40.
The tiebreaker has not been in use since
2002 because of the litigation, which was
brought by Parents Involved in Community
Schools, a group of white parents who say it
cost their children admission to the popular
Ballard High School.
The tiebreaker was initially invalidated by a
three-judge panel of the San Francisco-based
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.
But an 11-judge panel granted a new hearing
and upheld it 7 to 4.
The cases are Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School
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District No. 1 , No. 05-908, and Meredith v.
Jefferson County Board of Education , No.
05-915. Argument will take place in
December, with decisions due by July 2007.
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"Court to Weigh Race as Factor in School Rolls"
New York Times
June 5, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
rule on what measures, if any, public school
systems may use to maintain racial balance
in individual schools.
The eventual decision on whether they can
take race into account could affect hundreds
of school systems in all areas of the country.
The court accepted challenges to plans in
Louisville, Ky., where the schools were once
racially segregated by law, and in Seattle,
where segregation was never official but
was widespread because of residential
patterns.
Federal appeals courts upheld these plans,
both of which offer students a choice of
schools while taking race into account in
deciding which transfer applications to
accept. Variations of this approach are
common, and have been under legal attack
around the country.
The Supreme Court's decision to add the
cases to the calendar for its next term, a step
that by all appearances was controversial
within the court and unexpected outside it,
plunged the new Roberts court into one of
the country's deepest constitutional debates.
The action came three years after the court
upheld a racially conscious admissions plan
at the University of Michigan Law School.
Writing for the majority in that 5-to-4
decision, Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor suggested that, at
least in higher education, affirmative action
might be necessary for another 25 years.
The new cases do not ask the court to revisit
that decision, and the justices are unlikely to
do so. But the implications are far-reaching
nonetheless. The eventual decision, roughly
a year from now, could not only set the
court's path in this area but could also shape
the climate in which government policies
with respect to race will be debated.
One difference between the Michigan
decision and the new cases is that while the
University of Michigan sought to use
affirmative action to achieve a measure of
racial balance, the school districts are trying
to maintain such a balance.
In December, with Justice O'Connor still on
the court, the justices refused to hear a
challenge to a racially conscious student
assignment plan in the public schools of
Lynn, Mass. That plan, which a federal
appeals court had upheld, is basically
indistinguishable from the plans at issue in
the new cases: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School
District, No. 05-908, and Meredith v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, No.
05-915.
What has changed is the Supreme Court
itself, with the retirement in January of
Justice O'Connor and her replacement by
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. One lawyer
involved in the challenges to the Seattle and
Louisville plans, Sharon L. Browne of the
Pacific Legal Foundation, a conservative
public-interest law firm, expressed the view
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that this change made the difference. "I think
the writing's on the wall, or at least I hope it
is," Ms. Browne said in an interview
Monday.
The plans under review in the new cases
differ in details that are unlikely to prove
constitutionally significant. The Jefferson
County, Ky., school board adopted the
Louisville plan in 2001, shortly after the
school system was declared desegregated
and was released from 25 years of federal
court supervision.
The "managed choice" plan applies to all
schools, kindergarten through 12th grade. In
a district that is one-third nonwhite, every
school is required to seek a black student
enrollment of at least 15 percent and no
more than 50 percent.
The Louisville case was taken to the
Supreme Court by Crystal D. Meredith, a
white parent whose son, Joshua McDonald,
did not receive a requested transfer to attend
kindergarten in a school that was trying to
maintain a sufficient number of black
students.
The plan in Seattle, which has struggled for
decades to deal with the effects on its school
system of segregated housing patterns,
applies only to the city's 10 high schools.
The policy is one of "open choice," subject
to various "tiebreakers," one of which is
race. Other factors include geographic
proximity and whether a student has a
sibling at the desired school, both of which
count in favor of an application.
Under the "integration tiebreaker," high
schools that deviate by more than 15 percent
from the systemwide balance, which is 60
percent nonwhite, must take account of an
applicant's race in order not to deviate
further.
A group of parents organized as a nonprofit
corporation called Parents Involved in
Community Schools to fight the plan, and
filed the Supreme Court appeal after losing
by a vote of 7 to 4 in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Both appeals reached the court in January
and evidently provoked a vigorous internal
debate among the justices, who considered
the Seattle case six times and the Louisville
case seven times before issuing the one-line
order accepting both. Prolonged review of
this sort is unusual.
Briefs are now likely to pour into the court
in advance of a November argument; the
University of Michigan case drew more than
100 briefs. But one of the more influential
analyses may prove to be a brief concurring
opinion in the Seattle case by Judge Alex
Kozinski, the Ninth Circuit judge whose
views carry great weight among legal
conservatives.
Describing the Seattle plan as one "that
gives the American melting pot a healthy stir
without benefiting or burdening any
particular group," Judge Kozinski addressed
the Supreme Court justices directly, on the
assumption that they would soon be
reviewing the decision.
"There is much to be said for returning
primacy on matters of educational policy to
local officials," he said.
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"Supreme Court Will Hear Affirmative-Action Cases With Potentially Broad Meaning for
Higher Education The Chronicle of Higher Education"
Chronicle ofHigher Education
June 16, 2006
Jeffrey Selingo
Deciding once again to weigh in on the
explosive debate over affirmative action, the
U.S. Supreme Court agreed last week to take
up the question of whether race can be a
factor in assigning students to public
schools.
The court accepted two cases that are the
first involving racial preferences at
educational institutions since it handed down
two landmark rulings on race-conscious
college admissions in 2003, and since the
appointment of two new justices by
President Bush.
How the two appeals from a Seattle parents'
group and from a parent in Louisville, Ky.
may ultimately affect the Supreme Court's
decisions in the 2003 cases, which involved
the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, is
unclear and is already the subject of much
debate among lawyers and legal scholars.
Last week a few higher-education lawyers
laid out several scenarios that could result
for colleges from rulings in the two school-
district cases:
* Scenario 1. The decisions would contain
language that provided colleges with
guidance on how to apply the Michigan
rulings. The court did not endorse a single
admissions method in its mixed decisions in
2003. In one case, the court upheld the race-
conscious admissions policies used by
Michigan's law school because the school
considered each applicant individually. In
the other case, the justices struck down the
admissions policy at Michigan's main
undergraduate college because it awarded
each black, Hispanic, and American Indian
applicant a 20-point bonus on a 150-point
scale.
* Scenario 2. The rulings would suggest that
the court was open to revisiting the
Michigan decisions through another case
involving race-conscious admissions at
colleges.
* Scenario 3. The decisions would be
narrowly tailored and would apply only to
public school districts.
The wild cards in these cases, lawyers and
legal scholars agreed, are the two new
members of the court: Chief Justice John G.
Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
both of whom have right-of-center
reputations. The two appeals accepted last
week are similar to a case the court refused
to hear in December, when Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor was still on the bench. Justice
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in the
Michigan case that upheld the use of race in
admissions.
Colleges May Get Involved
Roger B. Clegg, general counsel for the
Center for Equal Opportunity, an advocacy
group that opposes racial preferences, said
last week that he found it interesting that the
two cases accepted by the court and the one
it rejected in December all upheld the use of
race in assigning students.
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"There is no conflict in the circuits," he said,
referring to the court's common practice of
resolving judgments at variance among the
different federal Courts of Appeal. "And the
conventional wisdom," he said, "is that the
Supreme Court doesn't take cases in order to
affirm."
Still, Mr. Clegg said, the Supreme Court is
not likely to use this occasion to overturn the
Michigan cases. "That's not going to
happen," he said. "But I think the court may
give some indication that the majority will
be willing reconsider the cases."
As a result, higher-education lawyers said, it
is probable that colleges will get involved in
the run-up to oral arguments in the school-
district cases by writing, for example, briefs
in support of the schools.
"I would frankly be surprised if the higher-
education community doesn't step up," said
Arthur L. Coleman, who is a partner with
the law firm of Holland & Knight here and
who helped write such a brief on behalf of
several public schools in the Michigan
higher-education cases. Mr. Coleman was
one of several lawyers who said the two
cases taken by the Supreme Court on
Monday could provide colleges with much-
needed legal guidance on how to tailor their
admissions systems narrowly enough to
remain within the law.
The Seattle case accepted by the Supreme
Court Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 05-
908 dates to 2000. That's when a group
called Parents Involved in Community
Schools sued the school district, arguing that
its method of using race as a tiebreaker
when it had more applicants than openings
in high schools was unconstitutional.
The plan, which allowed students to pick
among high schools, was upheld by the
Washington State Supreme Court. It was
struck down by a three-judge panel of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
but was later upheld by a 7-to-4 vote of the
entire appeals court.
The Kentucky case Meredith v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, No. 05-915
stems from a federal-court order to end
segregation in Louisville's schools. When
that federal decree ended, in 2001, the
county school district started to use race as
one of many factors in assigning schools. A
mother, Crystal Meredith, sued, asserting
that her son had been denied entrance into a
neighborhood school because he was white.
The plan was upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The Supreme Court is expected to hear the
cases in the term that begins in October.
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"Analysis: An Unanswered, Delicate Race Question"
SCOTUSblog
Monday, June 05, 2006
Lyle Denniston
Last October, judges on the Ninth Circuit
Court observed that "the Supreme Court has
never decided a case involving the
consideration of race in a voluntarily
imposed school assignment plan intended to
promote racially and ethnically diverse
[public] schools." A year ago, judges on the
First Circuit Court said much the same
thing: the Supreme Court "has not yet
considered a constitutional challenge to a
voluntary race-based transfer policy for
elementary and secondary schools..." The
Court had a chance to consider that issue last
December, but passed up the chance. Now,
with a change in composition, the Court has
opted to take it on. There may be a
connection.
In more than a half-century of dealing with
racial issues in the public schools, the Court
has not ruled on a case in which race is not
used as a way to separate the races in the K-
12 grades, in which race is not used to
provide a benefit to one race but not to
others, and in which racial assignments or
busing are not used to dismantle official
segregation of schools, classrooms or
faculties. In other words, the new generation
of cases on schools and race are not the
traditional kind under the original 19th
Century purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection clause. "We
are here working from doctrines concerning
the use of race-based criteria that are mainly
the product of 20th Century jurisprudence,"
remarked First Circuit Judge Michael
Boudin.
Put in the most benign way, the new race-
based plans are designed to achieve
educational and social benefits of "exposing
youngsters to those of different races," in
Judge Boudin's phrase. That is a precise
echo of some of the Supreme Court's
sentiments in ending official school
segregation in 1954 in Brown v. Board of
Education, and thus gives such plans their
most positive cultural character.
But, to opponents of such plans, they are
nothing but "racial balancing" that sends
"the wrong message to our children-that
racial discrimination is more important than
individual rights and liberties in today's
society," as the Pacific Legal Foundation's
Sharon L. Browne has put the matter.
The Supreme Court may not embrace either
one of those descriptions when it rules on
the two cases that it accepted on Monday for
review at its next Term: Parents Involved v.
Seattle School District (05-908) and
Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of
Education (05-915). But it has given itself
the task of drawing some historic
constitutional conclusions, and its change in
membership may make the difference in
how those are framed. At this stage, it may
be a matter of total uncertainty how the
Court will come out, making the new cases
potentially the most closely-watched of the
new Term.
The Court, it seems clear, has not been eager
to get involved in this new racial
controversy. Before it granted review of the
two cases from Seattle and Louisville, Ky.,
it had considered them at six consecutive
Conferences. That was not an indication that
the Court thought the cases lacked
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importance. It more likely was a sign of
hesitancy about whether there really is a
conflict in the lower courts in judging such
plans, so it wanted to be satisfied that the
time had definitely come for it to move into
the fray. There also could have been some
defensive concerns, supporting a resistance
to review when the voting lineup would not
be predictable.
When the Court had before it one of these
plans, from Lynn, Mass. (in Comfort v. Lynn
School Committee [05-348]), Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor was still on the bench. At that
point last December, however, it was still
uncertain when O'Connor's retirement would
occur, and when her replacement, Justice
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., would arrive. Although
this cannot be known by outsiders, the
chances are that the Court at that time was
avoiding major controversies in which the
Justices almost certainly would wind up
deeply divided. It took but one look at the
Lynn case, and passed, even though the
differences between that case and the ones
now granted are by no means glaring, and
the constitutional issues are virtually
identical.
Justice O'Connor, of course, wrote the
majoity opinion in 2003 when the Court-
dividing 5-4-decided the constitutional
issue that is newly at stake in the public
school cases, but it did so in Grutter v.
Bollinger, a case confined to the public
college level, dealing with admissions
criteria. The Court then allowed limited use
of race in college admissions decisions.
O'Connor's opinion was joined by the
Court's four moderate to liberal members-
Justices Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, David H. Souter and John Paul
Stevens.
Those other four remain on the Court, as do
three of the dissenters- Justices Anthony M.
Kennedy, Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, the fourth dissenter, is now
deceased. There is no way to predict how
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., will
approach the new public school cases, nor is
there about Justice Alito. But the two of
them do appear, at least at this early stage, to
hold the balance of voting power.
Part of the cloud of doubt surrounding the
new cases is that there is little in O'Connor's
Grutter opinion that suggests definitively
how she or her voting colleagues would
have viewed the same constitutional
question in the K-12 context. The lower
courts that have applied it to elementary and
secondary schools find in that ruling a set of
principles flowing out of the notion that
racial diversity is a positive value, at
whatever level of public education it might
be pursued. The difficulty for them-and
this is likely to be true, too, for the Supreme
Court-is in determining whether the details
of a particular plan make the means of
achieving that goal valid.
But, perhaps before getting to those crucial
details, the Court may have to confront
directly the core claim of opponents of those
plans: that race cannot be used at all in
public school student assignment, unless it is
"remedial"-that is, correcting for
identifiable, continuing discrimination
against identifiable students. And that could
force the Court to answer a simple but
profound question: is the achievement of
racial diversity itself in any way "remedial",
and, if it is, what evils does it remedy?
It is not clear, yet, how many school districts
across the country may have plans akin to
those now before the Court. By one
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estimate, some 1,000 districts are using or
experimenting with "racial diversity" in their
student assignments. No doubt, the numbers
will get more precise by the time the Court
takes up the cases in early winter. A flood of
amici filings are sure to come.
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"The Alito Difference"
The Washington Times
June 13, 2006
Bruce Fein
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito is
unlike his vacillating predecessor Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. Everything in her
constitutional universe was opaque. Justice
Alito's philosophy is made of sterner stuff.
The difference will first find dramatic
expression in matters of racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment. Last week,
the high court agreed to review twin
conflicting decisions addressing use of race
in public elementary and secondary school
admissions to achieve racially balanced
student bodies: Parents Involved In
Community Schools v. Seattle School
District, No. 1; and, Meredith v. Jefferson
County Public Schools.
Justice O'Connor, writing for a thin 5-4
majority in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003),
upheld racial preferences in selecting
applicants for admission to public
universities. She rhapsodized over
educational, economic and sociological
wonders allegedly derived from racially
diverse campuses. Whites better understand
blacks and vice versa. Racial stereotypes are
dispelled. Classroom discussion is enriched
and enlightened. Student achievement
climbs. Students are better prepared to
prosper in an increasingly diverse work
force and society. And, success in a global
marketplace requires exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas and
viewpoints. (But after 25 years, Justice
O'Connor opined, progress in race relations
will have superceded the contemporary
justifications for diversity and make their
constitutionality highly dubious).
With Justice Alito having replaced Justice
O'Connor, the court granted review of
Seattle School District and Meredith either
to overrule or to sharply confine Grutter.
Justice O'Connor was largely an echo
chamber for the media and academic elite.
Accordingly, she advanced unconvincing
reasons sustaining racial preferences to avert
their tart criticism. If racial diversity yielded
the fabulous nontrivial educational,
economic and sociological benefits Justice
O'Connor celebrated, parents and students
would be demanding the Michigan Law
School admissions policy blessed in Grutter
be aped everywhere. Employers would
similarly place a premium on their
graduates, and ask applicants to disclose the
racial compositions of the schools they
attended. Students from racially balanced
schools would be overrepresented among
recipients of educational, business,
community or international honors. They
would be more vocal than others in
preaching against racial discrimination. And
they would be clearly superior to their
counterparts who graduated before initiation
of racial preferences.
Yet none of these expectancies has been
substantiated by ocular evidence. The
University of Chicago Law School, for
example, eschews racial preferences without
any apparent handicap to its graduates in any
respect, including racial attitudes.
Justice Alito, in contrast to Justice
O'Connor, has been immersed in the
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philosophy that racial distinctions are
inherently odious. As Justice Antonin Scalia
elaborated in Adarand Constructors v. Pena
(1995), in the eyes of the government there
is only one race. It is American. Thus, the
Supreme Court held in Anderson v. Martin
(1964) that identifying the race of a
candidate on ballots violated the Equal
Protection Clause by encouraging racial bloc
voting and the subordination of merit to skin
color. Justice Alito will be inclined to
overrule Grutter because it sanctions a two-
track government admissions policy
pivoting on race, simpliciter.
The Seattle School District litigation
underscores Grutter's vulnerability. In 2001-
2002, the School District employed race in
high school student assignments to avoid
racial concentration on any campus.
Reminiscent of Justice O'Connor, the district
explained: "Diversity in the classroom
increases the likelihood that students will
discuss racial or ethnic issues and be more
likely to socialize with people of different
races. Diversity is thus a valuable resource
for teaching students to become citizens in a
multiracial/multi-ethnic world." The district
added that diversity enhances education and
racial and cultural understanding. But it
abandoned race in school assignments
during the Seattle School District litigation.
A colorblind standard has prevailed for the
last four school terms with no evidence that
educational achievement or race relations
have suffered.
The nation's history of racial discrimination
is admittedly ugly. Slavery was enshrined in
the Constitution. Jim Crow succeeded
Reconstruction. The "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson defiled the
14th Amendment. Blacks risked and gave
that last full measure of devotion in World
Wars I and II in defense of freedom while
fighting in segregated ranks and subjected to
racial discrimination at home. The South's
"massive resistance" to Brown v. Board of
Education segued into Bull Connor's dogs
and Jim Clark's cattle prods to foil black
voter registration.
This history and much more teaches that
racial distinctions championed by
government are convulsive. They war with
the objective of a colorblind society by
sending a message that individuals should be
sorted by race.
The way to get beyond racism is by
prohibition- including the overruling of
Grutter-not by winking at its practice for
25 years in the fatuous belief that racial
preferences then will be voluntarily
surrendered.
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"Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action Is Created Equal"
New York Times
June 11, 2006
Jeffrey Rosen
Now that the Supreme Court has agreed to
hear two cases challenging racial balancing
in public schools, some conservatives hope
the end of affirmative action is near.
After all, they say, why would the Supreme
Court suddenly agree to hear cases about
racial balancing in Seattle and Louisville
when the court-with Sandra Day O'Connor
still serving-refused last December to hear
a similar case from Massachusetts? It must
be, the thinking goes, that the court, with
two new and more conservative justices,
John G. Roberts Jr. and Samuel A. Alito Jr.,
wants to overturn affirmative action.
That optimism may be premature, and not
because there is a hidden liberal streak on
the court. Instead, there is a vigorous debate
among prominent Republican judges and
legal scholars about whether racial balancing
in public schools is an acceptable form of
affirmative action. Some conservatives
believe that racial balancing plans, while not
colorblind, are still constitutional.
The unexpected fissures among
conservatives about how colorblind the
Constitution should be suggest that certain
forms of affirmative action might be more
acceptable to conservatives than liberals had
feared.
The Seattle and Louisville cases, which the
Supreme Court will hear next fall, involve
challenges to plans known as "managed
choice" or "open choice." In Seattle, parents
can apply to send their children to any
public high school in the district.
If a school is oversubscribed, students are
chosen based on a number of "tie-breakers,"
including racial targets designed to ensure
that each school's racial makeup doesn't
differ by more than 15 percent from the
racial composition of the Seattle public
schools as a whole.
Last October, no one was surprised when the
famously liberal United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Seattle plan. It cited a 2003 Supreme Court
opinion, by Justice O'Connor, which held
that classroom diversity was a compelling
governmental interest for law schools and
universities.
But it was eye-opening that Judge Alex
Kozinski, a conservative libertarian on the
Ninth Circuit, wrote an unexpected
concurring opinion. "That a student is
denied the school of his choice may be
disappointing, but it carries no racial stigma
and says nothing at all about that
individual's aptitude or ability," he wrote.
And Judge Kozinski quoted the opinion of
Chief Judge Michael Boudin of the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
another Republican judge, who upheld the
use of racial balancing in a Massachusetts
school choice plan. Unlike "modem
affirmative action," Judge Boudin had
written, these plans do not "seek to give one
racial group an edge over another."
Some conservative scholars suggest that
there may be significant differences between
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racial balancing for public elementary and
high schools and racial preferences for
competitive public universities.
"When you're talking about public schools,
everybody's got to go somewhere, and it's
not as if some schools are necessarily better
than others," said Charles Fried, a
conservative law professor at Harvard. "At
some point, the government has to have
some basis for breaking the tie."
Professor Fried said he had not made up his
mind on the issue. "I think Roberts and Alito
are both men who are open to arguments,
and I would trust them to think long and
hard about this," he said.
Conservatives have also long emphasized
the importance of deferring to local school
officials, a reaction in part to judicially
imposed busing programs.
In the Seattle and Louisville cases, the plans
were designed by local politicians.
"This is not the result of some liberal master
plan; it was adopted from the ground up,"
said Samuel Issacharoff, a liberal legal
scholar at Columbia Law School. Judicial
deference is as deeply held a conservative
principle as the importance of a colorblind
society, and conservative judges and
activists are conducting a vigorous internal
debate about how these principles should be
reconciled.
Last year, for example, the Supreme Court,
in another opinion by Justice O'Connor,
struck down California's policy of racially
segregating new prisoners to prevent gang
violence. Justice Clarence Thomas and
Justice Antonin Scalia, ordinarily fierce
champions of colorblind policies, argued
that an exception should be made in this
case because of the importance of deferring
to the expertise of local prison officials.
Opponents of affirmative action don't buy
conservative arguments that racial balancing
is acceptable. Parents don't view all public
schools as equal, they argue, so racial tie-
breakers force some parents to send their
children to worse schools farther from home
because of their race.
"In some ways, the damage may be greater
than in the university context, since this may
limit the ability of black families to escape
inferior schools by transferring to schools
where the authorities deem there to be too
many blacks," says Peter H. Schuck of Yale
Law School, author of "Diversity in
America," a prominent critique of
affirmative action.
In the Seattle case, the conservative
dissenting judges wrote that the educational
benefits of diversity for university students
were less obvious for lower-school students.
The dissenters quoted David J. Armor, a
George Mason professor who has reported
finding little connection between racial
integration and student achievement.
"Where we have had very substantial long-
term desegregation, we did not find the
achievement gap changing significantly,"
Mr. Armor said in an interview. "I did find a
modest association for math but not reading
in terms of racial composition and
achievement, but there's a big state
variation."
Professor Armor estimated that "at least
dozens or maybe hundreds of school
districts still use race in some way" and said
he hoped that the Supreme Court would put
an end to all race-conscious assignment
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plans. "We have racially imbalanced
neighborhoods and cities based on where
people choose to live. What's wrong with
racially imbalanced schools?"
IF the court agrees with him, it might require
districts to consider "race-neutral
alternatives," like a lottery, to decide which
students gain admission to popular schools.
But given segregated housing patterns, that
might mean the end of integration.
Chief Justice Roberts, in his first term, has
shown a skill in persuading his colleagues to
join unanimous opinions decided on narrow
grounds. The race cases may test his
leadership abilities more than any he has
confronted so far. And the fact that
conservatives disagree so vigorously about
how to apply the principle of colorblindness
in different contexts makes the outcome
especially hard to predict.
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"Ninth Circuit, in En Banc Ruling, Allows Use of Race As 'Tiebreaker'in High School Pupil
Assignments"
Metropolitan News
October 21, 2005
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled en banc yesterday that a plan used by
the Seattle public schools to assign students
to high schools, taking into consideration the
race of students competing for limited spots
at popular schools, did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In a 7-4 decision citing the 2003 Supreme
Court rulings on affirmative action in
college admissions, the judges said that the
Seattle plan was "narrowly tailored to meet
the District's compelling interests" in
promoting diversity and avoiding the
isolation of racial minorities.
Judge Raymond C. Fisher wrote the
majority opinion, with the concurrence of
Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder and Judges
Harry Pregerson, Michael Daly Hawkins,
William A. Fletcher, and Johnnie B.
Rawlinson. Judge Alex Kozinski concurred
separately.
Fisher said it may be even more important
for high schools to use race as an admissions
factor than it is for colleges, because not all
students go on to college.
"For these students, their public high school
educational experience will be their sole
opportunity to reap the benefits of a diverse
learning environment," the judge wrote.
Judge Carlos T. Bea dissented. While there
is unquestioned value in diversity, he wrote,
"[t]he issue here is whether this idea may be
imposed by government coercion, rather
than societal conviction; whether students
and their parents may choose, or whether
their government may choose for them."
Judges Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Richard C.
Tallman, and Consuelo M. Callahan joined
Bea in dissent.
.A three-judge Ninth Circuit panel ruled in
2002 that the use of race as a factor in
school assignments violates 1-200, a 1998
initiative similar to California's Proposition
209. But it later vacated that ruling and
asked the Washington Supreme Court to rule
on whether the plan violated 1-200.
When the Washington high court said the
plan did not violate the state law, the case
came back to the Ninth Circuit for resolution
of the case under the Equal Protection
Clause. A panel ruled 2-1 in February that it
did, but a majority of the judges voted to
review that decision en banc.
The "open choice" plan, which was first
adopted in the 1970s, allows students to give
a first, second, or third preference as to
which of the city's 10 public high schools
they wish to attend. But because the
overwhelming majority 82 percent for the
2000-2001 school year prefer to attend one
of five particular schools, certain students
are given preference in determining whose
wishes will be honored first.
The highest preference is given to those who
wish to attend a school in which their
siblings are already enrolled. After that,
however, preference was given to those
wishing to attend a school in which
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members of their racial group were
significantly underrepresented in
comparison to their percentage of the district
as a whole.
The district modified the plan several years
ago by eliminating the racial "tiebreaker"
pending the outcome of the litigation. A
spokeswoman said it would be up to the
school board to decide whether the district
will reinstate the tiebreaker immediately or
wait to see if the Supreme Court agrees to
hear the case.
When the tiebreaker was in effect, some
whites were prevented from attending three
high schools in which white enrollment was
limited to 55 percent, while non-white
enrollment was limited at one school.
Because the third tiebreaker was distance,
some students had to attend schools located
far from home.
The group that challenged
Involved in Community
would continue its efforts.
the plan,
Schools,
Parents
said it
"We are going to petition the U.S. Supreme
court to look at this," PICS president
Kathleen Brose, who is white, told The
Associated Press. "It's too important a
decision for the city of Seattle. These
children need access to their neighborhood
schools, and they're not going to get it if the
district uses a racial tiebreaker."
Brose said the tiebreaker kept her oldest
daughter out of the high school closest to
their home, and her other top choices as
well. As a freshman, she wound up having
to commute 30 minutes to another high
school. The Pacific Legal Foundation, a
Sacramento-based advocacy group that has
brought a number of Proposition 209
enforcement proceedings, filed an amicus
brief in support of PICS. PLF previously
represented an Orange County citizen who
won a Fourth District Court of Appeal ruling
that a similar plan in the Huntington Beach
Union High School District violated the
California initiative.
But the Ninth Circuit majority yesterday
agreed with the district that maintaining
racially diverse student bodies "increases the
likelihood that students will discuss racial or
ethnic issues and be more likely to socialize
with people of different races," trains pupils
"to become citizens in a multi-racial/multi-
ethnic world, "brings different viewpoints
and experiences to classroom discussions
and thereby enhances the educational
process," and "fosters racial and cultural
understanding, which is particularly
important in a racially and culturally diverse
society such as ours."
The ruling is the second federal appeallate
opinion this year to uphold voluntary
desegregation plans by city school districts,
cases that are helping define how far
districts can go to ensure diversity in their
classrooms. In June, a 3-2 ruling by the First
Circuit upheld a plan used by the school
district of Lynn, Mass.
The case is Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1, 01-
35450.
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"Rulings may back Seattle schools' racial tiebreaker"
The Seattle Times
July 7, 2003
Keith Ervin
High Court decisions might lend support for
the policy, but lawyers are reluctant to
predict a verdict.
The highest courts of Washington and the
nation recently gave the Seattle School
District added clout in its legal defense of
race-based assignments of students to
schools.
But the optimism of the district's lawyers is
tempered by their awareness that predicting
court rulings is risky at best.
While the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
theoretical underpinning of some efforts to
boost racial diversity, it struck down a
university admission process that
automatically gave an advantage to
underrepresented minorities.
The future of a racial tiebreaker used to
assign some students to Seattle schools will
depend largely on how the 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals applies issues of federal
law in a challenge filed by parents.
Parents Involved in Community Schools
(PICS) and the school district have been
battling for three years over PICS' claim that
state law and the U.S. Constitution forbid
race-based student assignment.
The district maintains it can legitimately
consider students' race in order to give them
an integrated education that will prepare
them for a diverse society.
Seattle's student-assignment plan generally
allows parents to choose their children's
schools, but it uses a series of tiebreakers to
determine who gets into a school where the
number of requests exceeds available seats.
For high-school assignments, the first
tiebreaker favors a student who has a sibling
in his or her preferred school. The next
tiebreaker, race, is used only if a school's
racial composition differs by more than 15
percentage points from the districtwide
racial balance.
The Washington state Supreme Court on
June 26 gave a ringing endorsement to the
assignment plan, which it said does not
violate Initiative 200's ban on racial
discrimination or preferences.
"This court has repeatedly and clearly found
that segregation offends the values of our
national constitution, be that segregation de
factor or de jure, and that school districts are
empowered to work to end that
discrimination," the state court ruled.
Because the Seattle tiebreaker favors whites
in some schools and racial minorities in
others, the state Supreme Court called the
plan "racially neutral."
The federal 9th Circuit, after initially
striking down the race tiebreaker last year,
asked the state Supreme Court to determine
whether the tiebreaker is consistent with
state law. The case now goes back to the 9th
Circuit, which will decide whether the
tiebreaker violates the U.S. Constitution.
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Three days before the state Supreme Court
opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed
affirmative action in a case Grutter v.
Bollinger involving the University of
Michigan Law School. But in Gratz v.
Bollinger, the high court struck down an
undergraduate admission process at the
university that automatically gave an
advantage to underrepresented minorities.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote in
Grutter v. Bollinger that creating a diverse
student body was "at the heart of the Law
School's proper institutional mission" and
that tomorrow's lawyers need exposure to
"widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints."
Seattle School District General Counsel
Mark Green hailed that ruling and the state
Supreme Court opinion as "a huge judicial
statement about diversity" a view many
lawyers share.
Assessing The Details
But will the finer points of the Seattle plan
survive judicial review when the case is
finally resolved, either by the 9th Circuit or
the U.S. Supreme Court?
On that question, lawyers are in sharp
disagreement.
In reviewing affirmative-action and
desegregation cases, federal courts apply
two tests known as "close scrutiny." The
Gratz case suggests Seattle's racial policy
will easily pass the first test, a showing that
the district has a compelling interest in
promoting diversity.
The second test is whether the plan is
"narrowly tailored," that is, causes the least
possible disruption of people's lives to
accomplish its goals.
When the U.S. Supreme Court approved the
Michigan Law School's individualized
system of giving minority students a
preference in admissions, it also struck down
a more rigid, numerical plan at Michigan's
undergraduate College of Literature, Science
and the Arts.
The undergraduate plan, which gave
underrepresented minorities an automatic
20-point advantage on a 150-point scale,
made race the decisive factor for "virtually
every minimally qualified" minority student,
the court found. Therefore, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist wrote in Gratz v.
Bollinger, the plan was not narrowly
tailored.
In the PICS case, the 9th Circuit will decide
whether the Gratz narrow-tailoring standard
applies to public-school assignments as well
as to a selective university-admission
process.
Key Test in Question
PICS attorney Harry Korrell said Gratz
"does affirm that you cannot have just plain
race balancing as your goal, which in our
view is exactly what the school-district plan
does. It says race cannot be the deciding
factor, it can be only one factor among
many, which is not what the school-district
plan does."
Atlanta attorney Alfred Lindseth, who has
represented school districts in desegregation
cases and once advised Seattle on an earlier
assignment plan, agreed with Korrell.
"I think they'll have a tough time passing
that test," Lindseth said. "They depend
solely on the race of the student, they're
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completely mechanical, there's no judgment
or meaningful review. ... If the decision is
based just on the race of the child, I think the
Michigan cases would say you can't do it."
Others Disagree
Washington, D.C., lawyer William Taylor,
who has litigated desegregation cases since
the 1950s when he worked with the late
Thurgood Marshall, said the U.S. Supreme
Court's narrow-tailoring standard might
apply to a few high schools around the
country with selective admissions. He said
the standard does not seem relevant to
regular high schools, which are "fungible,"
or interchangeable.
"The reason they outlawed a more
mechanical system," Taylor said, "is they
have a system based on merit and they want
to make sure that merit isn't mechanistically
applied. But in a situation where the school
opportunities are largely fungible, you
wouldn't have any reason to have a
complicated review system of each
applicant."
Curt Levey, an attorney for the Washington,
D.C.-based Center for Individual Rights,
which represented students who sued the
University of Michigan, said that if courts
were "perfectly logical," the Seattle district
would have something else going for it: the
state Supreme Court ruling.
"Certainly if something passes the test for I-
200, which allows no racial preferences,
then it must pass the standard for the
Michigan cases," Levey said. "The 1-200
standard is a tougher standard."
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"On the Docket: Meredith, Crystal v. Jefferson County Bd. of Education, et al."
Medill News Service
June 5, 2006
David Gialanella
Since desegregation, many Americans have
considered diversity to be an invaluable
societal quality, but in Jefferson County,
Kentucky, some students are being bused
upwards of three hours a day roundtrip in
the interest of diversity.
In an effort to ensure that no one public
school has an overwhelming black or white
population, Jefferson County has an
enrollment plan that places students in
different schools according to racial
demographics. It requires that each school
maintain a black population of no greater
than 50 percent, but no less than 15 percent.
The plan, which has existed in varying
forms since a court-ordered desegregation
policy for the county was handed down by a
federal judge in 1975, offers a choice of
schools, but not all preferences can be
accommodated, and an application process
is involved. However, according to statistics,
about 95 percent of students are able to
enroll in one of their two top choices of non-
magnet schools.
The current arrangement, instituted in 2001,
has some students being bused cross-county,
taking up more time per day than most
students spend in transit in several weeks. It
poses obvious logistical issues and detaches
children and their parents from the
communities they call home, parents say.
Jefferson County parents who became fed
up with busing and the complexities of
enrollment (both magnet and non-magnet
schools have long admissions processes)
brought a civil suit against the county in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky. They claim their children's
constitutional rights have been violated
based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment, the purpose of which is to
ensure that all Americans enjoy equal
protections under all laws.
The District Court upheld the plan almost in
full, holding: "The 2001 Plan is a proper 'fit'
because it is sufficiently flexible to
determine school assignments for all
students by a host of factors, such as
residence, student choice, capacity, school
and program popularity, pure chance and
race." In other words, race is a factor but not
the main factor in the enrollment process.
The court based its opinion on the idea that
the Jefferson County plan does not amount
to a quota system, which is prohibited,
according to precedent.
In Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, a 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision,
it was established that hard racial quotas
(such as requiring that each school maintain
a 34 percent black population, which would
be consistent with the county average)
violate the Constitution.
The District Court touched on this subject
and found the county plan inoffensive to
Equal Protection: "...some attention to
numbers, without more, does not transform a
flexible admissions system into a rigid
quota. Common sense and the Supreme
Court suggest that any strict or de facto
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racial quota has a couple of known
characteristics: it has a precise target, and it
insulates some applicants from competition
with other applicants."
The district court also noted that the plan is
"narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling
interest," which, in this case, is diversity;
that is, race is used as a placement factor in a
narrow and limited way. That standard was
set forth three years ago in a pair of opinions
issued by the U.S. Supreme Court that dealt
with undergraduate and law school
admissions at the University of Michigan.
Opponents to the plan argue that an opinion
pertinent to higher education cannot apply to
public schools at the kindergarten through
12th grade level.
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals called the
lower court's opinion "well-reasoned" and
thus affirmed the decision without issuing an
opinion of its own, which is rare. But now
the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
the case, which allows parents to take their
Equal Protection challenge up one more
level.
"It is the parents' feeling that this is no
longer a segregated society ... we are not
going back to the 1950s," said Honi
Goldman, Media Relations Coordinator for
attorney Ted Gordon, who represents
parents opposed to the plan. So, she said
during a phone interview, it is high time to
do away with an enrollment plan that is
based on demographics from thirty years
ago; that Kentuckians are serving their
diversity interest without need for the plan.
Proponents of the plan argue that students
are still not being exposed enough to racially
diverse environments, and that busing
creates only a limited inconvenience.
"The number of students who end up
making a trip they wouldn't normally make
is a small price to pay for having diversity
throughout the system," said Francis J.
Mellen Jr., the attorney representing the
county.
The case has gotten little media coverage in
Jefferson County since the Supreme Court
announced on June 5, 2006 that it would
hear the case, but residents understand the
implications of the Court's decision on their
everyday lives.
"There seems to be a strong sense of
maintaining integrated schools and fear
about returning to the 'way things were',"
stated Lauren E. Roberts, Public Information
Officer for Jefferson County Public Schools,
in an e-mail.
When the Court accepted review in the
Louisville case, it announced it would set
oral arguments in tandem with Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District #1.
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"Schools' Efforts Hinge on Justices' Ruling in Cases on Race and School Assignments"
New York Times
June 24, 2006
Sam Dillon
School officials in Berkeley, Calif., take race
as well as parent income into account as
they assign students to public schools, with a
result that many black children who live
downtown are bused to classes in the mostly
white neighborhoods on the hills that
overlook San Francisco Bay.
In Lynn, Mass., the authorities guarantee
that children can attend their neighborhood
school, but consider race in weighing
students' transfer requests, sometimes
blocking those that would increase racial
imbalance.
And here in Louisville, the school board
uses race as a factor in a student assignment
plan to keep enrollments at most schools
roughly in line with the district's overall
racial composition, making this one of the
most thoroughly integrated urban school
systems in the nation.
As different as they are, all these approaches
and many more like them could now be in
jeopardy, lawyers say, because of the
Supreme Court's decision this month to
review cases involving race and school
assignment programs here and in Seattle.
"We'll be watching this very closely,
because whichever way the Supreme Court
rules, it will certainly have an impact on our
district," said Arthur R. Culver,
superintendent of schools in Champaign, Ill.,
where African-American students make up
36 percent of students. Under a court-
supervised plan, the district keeps the
proportion of black students in all schools
within 15 percentage points of that average
by controlling school assignments.
Over the past 15 years, courts have ended
desegregation orders in scores of school
districts. But many districts around the
country seek to maintain diversity with
voluntary programs like magnet schools and
magnet programs, clustering plans that
group schools in black neighborhoods with
those in white, and weighted admissions
lotteries that assign classroom seats by race.
All of this is now a gray area of the law until
there is guidance from the Supreme Court on
how far school systems may go in the quest
for racial diversity.
Courts in the 1990's mostly struck down the
use of race in assignment decisions, but
three federal rulings since 2003 have
permitted its use. As the legal ambiguity has
grown, hundreds of districts have dropped
voluntary efforts to maintain racial balance.
Others have vigorously pursued them, even
as a debate has emerged over whether
racially mixed schools provide the nation
with important educational benefits.
"Most school districts believe that there are
educational benefits in having students
attend school with other students of different
backgrounds," said Maree Sneed, a lawyer
who filed a brief in the Louisville case on
behalf of the Council of the Great City
Schools, a coalition of the nation's largest
urban districts. "It prepares them to be better
citizens."
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But Roger Clegg, president of the Center for
Equal Opportunity, a Washington group
critical of affirmative action, said such
assertions were based on "touchy-feely
social science."
"It'd be dangerous for the court to allow
discrimination whenever a school board
produces some social scientist who claims
that racially balancing schools to the nth
degree is essential for teaching students to
be good citizens," Mr. Clegg said.
The debate comes as immigration, housing
patterns and ethnic change have made
achieving racial balance in the schools an
increasing challenge.
A study published this year by the Civil
Rights Project at Harvard University
reported that partly because of the rapid
growth of Latino and Asian populations, the
traditional black-white model of American
race relations was breaking down. Yet white
students remained the most racially isolated
group, even though they were attending
schools with more minority students than
ever before, the report said.
Although whites in 2003-04 made up 58
percent of the nation's public school
population, the average white student
attended a school where 78 percent of pupils
were also white, the study said.
The proportion of black students attending
schools where 10 percent of students or
fewer were white increased to 38 percent in
2003-04 from 34 percent in 1991-92.
Gary Orfield, the project's director, said a
decision barring the use of race in student
assignments would most likely intensify
those trends.
"School boards would be captives to the
racial segregation that occurs in housing
markets," Mr. Orfield said. "Boards would
be forbidden to do what courts once ordered
them to do, and what they now want to do
voluntarily."
How many of the nation's 15,000 districts
currently consider race in assigning students
to schools is unclear because no one keeps
track, experts said. A brief filed in the
Louisville case by the Pacific Legal
Foundation, a conservative public-interest
law firm, asserts that "nearly 1,000 districts"
have some type of race-based assignment
plan.
But that figure traces from a 1990
Department of Education survey of schools,
and David J. Armor, a George Mason
University professor who participated in that
survey, said that in the 1990's, many districts
abandoned race-based plans. Still, he
estimated that "many hundreds of school
districts" continued to use race in assigning
students to schools.
Many of the nation's largest urban districts
have so few white students that large-scale
plans to seek racial balance are hardly
feasible. New York, where 14 percent of
students are white, does not consider race in
school assignments, said Michael Best, the
Department of Education's general counsel.
The only exception is Mark Twain
Intermediate School in Brooklyn, where a
1974 federal court order requires that the
school's racial demographics be kept in line
with surrounding middle schools.
At least a half-dozen cities have developed
voluntary student transfer programs that
involve enrolling minority students from an
urban district in a suburban district.
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The Jefferson County district in Louisville is
one of the most thoroughly integrated urban
school systems in the nation. That is partly
because its boundaries include suburbs as
well as Louisville's urban core. Sixty percent
of students are white, and 35 percent are
black.
Its student assignment plan, which evolved
from a court-ordered desegregation effort,
keeps black enrollment in most schools in
the range of 15 percent to 50 percent by
encouraging, and in some cases obliging,
white students to attend schools in black
neighborhoods, and vice versa.
Fran Ellers and her husband are writers who
are white. They live in the Highlands
neighborhood east of downtown. But they
enrolled their children, Jack and Zoe, at
Coleridge-Taylor Montessori Elementary in
the largely black West End.
"We wanted a diverse environment," Ms.
Ellers said. "When I toured Coleridge-
Taylor, I was struck by the mix of black and
white children, quietly working together as
equals in a classroom."
Nechelle D. Crawford, by contrast, who is
African-American and lives in the West
End, said her sons Keion and Jeron could
attend Coleridge-Taylor, but instead she
opted to send them to Wilder Elementary in
a largely white suburb 25 minutes away by
bus. "The boys love Wilder," Mrs. Crawford
said, adding that there are a number of
international students. "They have different
opportunities, see different faces."
In a survey carried out in 2000 by the
University of Kentucky, 67 percent of
parents said they believed that a school's
enrollment should reflect the overall racial
diversity of the school district.
A white lawyer, Teddy B. Gordon, ran for a
seaton the Jefferson County School Board in
2004, promising to work to end the district's
desegregation plan. He finished last, behind
three other candidates.
Mr. Gordon represents the plaintiff in the
Louisville case, Crystal D. Meredith, who is
white. She sued after the district denied her
request to transfer her son Joshua from
Young Elementary, in the West End, to
Bloom Elementary, nearer her home. The
district said the transfer would disrupt
Young's racial balance.
Judge John G. Heyburn II of Federal District
Court ruled against Ms. Meredith in 2004,
saying that the district had shown a
''compelling interest" in maintaining
integrated schools. A federal appeals court
upheld that ruling, but the Supreme Court
has now agreed to review the case.
In an interview, Mr. Gordon predicted that if
Louisville's student assignment plan was
overturned, the schools would rapidly
resegregate. But that should be of no
concern, he said.
"We're a diverse society, a multiethnic
society, a colorblind society," he said. "Race
is history."
Chester Darling, the lawyer who represented
parents in a 1999 suit challenging a school
assignment plan in Lynn, Mass., holds
similar views. "If children are in segregated
schools, de facto or not, as long as they are
getting the education they need that's fine,"
he said.
Lynn, nine miles north of Boston, is one of
20 Massachusetts school districts that
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receives financial incentives for promoting
racial balance under state law. Lynn's plan
seeks to keep the proportion of nonwhite
students in elementary schools within 15
percent of the overall proportion of
minorities in the district's student
population. Last year, 32 percent of students
were white, and 68 percent were nonwhite.
Under the Berkeley plan, parents choose
three schools, and the district weighs
classroom space and parents' education and
income, as well as race in assigning the
child.
"New parents would prefer to have their kids
in a neighborhood school, that's pretty
overwhelming," said Michele Lawrence,
Berkeley's superintendent. "But if I surveyed
parents who have gone through the process
and met teachers, they would have a high
percentage of satisfaction."
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"Court backs Lynn use of race in school plan"
The Boston Globe
June 17, 2005
Shelley Murphy and Maria Sacchetti
A federal appeals court yesterday ruled that
the Lynn public schools could continue
using race as a factor in student transfers,
opening the door for other school systems to
devise similar ways to guarantee diversity in
schools.
The 3-to-2 decision on Lynn's voluntary
desegregation plan offers an alternative for
school systems at a time when most courts
have eliminated busing and other mandatory
race-based policies for assigning students.
Lynn chose to create its own desegregation
plan in the 1980s, hoping to prevent racial
strife and segregation. Its case is one of a
few nationwide that could redefine the role
race could play in assigning students to
schools.
But the ruling is not necessarily the final
word on the issue. The plaintiffs in the Lynn
case, a group of white and minority parents,
say they will appeal to the US Supreme
Court, which has never weighed in on
voluntary desegregation plans in public
schools.
Lynn lets students attend their neighborhood
schools, regardless of race, but students
cannot change schools if their departure
would make either school more racially
imbalanced. The plaintiffs complained that
the student assignment system was
discriminatory and denied their children a
place in schools because of race.
"This is precedent-making," said Gary
Orfield, a Harvard education professor and
director of the Civil Rights Project, who
testified in support of Lynn during the
federal trial. "It could be the beginning of a
reopening of a desegregation effort. It
recognizes the very positive benefits of
something that has been attacked widely."
The US Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, in the majority opinion written by
Judge Kermit V. Lipez, said race relations
and academic achievement in Lynn
improved under the policy.
"We are persuaded by the extensive expert
testimony in the record, rooted in
observations specific to Lynn, that there are
significant educational benefits to be derived
from a racially diverse student body in the
K-12 context," the court wrote. "Lynn has a
compelling interest in obtaining those
benefits."
Judge Bruce M. Selya, who was on a three-
judge appeals court panel that found the
Lynn plan unconstitutional in October,
wrote the dissent.
"The majority's eagerness to justify
departing from precedent frees it to strike
out on its own, fashioning a rule that flies in
the teeth of the Supreme Court's stalwart
opposition to the use of inflexible, race-
determinative methods in granting or
denying benefits to citizens," Selya wrote.
Lynn crafted its voluntary desegregation
plan in the late 1980s. Students are not
required to move to another school to
achieve racial balance, but beginning in
1989, if they wanted to switch schools, they
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could be denied a transfer if it would upset
the racial balance.
A school is considered balanced if its
nonwhite enrollment is close to the district
average, 47 to 77 percent of an elementary
school's student body. Roughly a third of
Lynn's students choose to attend a school
other than their neighborhood school.
In Massachusetts, the ruling allowing Lynn
to keep race as a factor will help 21 other
school systems with voluntary desegregation
plans, educators say. The point, they say, is
that the judges have said that race can be
used in some fashion.
"This decision allows cities like us and Lynn
and other cities to do what we think is best
for education," said Salem School
Superintendent Herb Levine. "Some people
would call it social engineering, and so be it.
But what it really is is that segregated
schools don't work for minority kids. They
don't work for white kids either, especially
in the world as it is today."
Boston attorney Michael Williams, who
represents families in the suit against Lynn,
said students in Lynn and elsewhere can
achieve academically without any specific
racial mix. He said the system has improved
because of a change in demographics.
Chester Darling, an attorney who also
represents the plaintiffs, said yesterday's
ruling "grates against improved race
relations" by allowing Lynn to keep a plan
that rejects transfers based solely on race.
"What this case says is people are defined by
their color," he said. "And you don't define
people by their color."
Since the early 1990s, courts have released
many school systems from court-ordered
desegregation plans, leading to complaints
that many schools have become
predominantly minority again, said Chinh
Le, a lawyer with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in New York. In 1998, a
federal court threw out the use of race in
admissions to Boston's exam schools.
Yesterday's decision offers the highest
judicial endorsement of a voluntary effort to
desegregate schools, Le said.
"There have been a number of cases that
have led to resegregation, and this case may
be an antidote for that," said Le.
The ruling-while it only affects states
under the First Circuit: Massachusetts,
Maine, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire,
plus Puerto Rico-could also influence
pending legal battles elsewhere in the nation,
he and Orfield said. Last year, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals threw out the
Seattle public schools' high school
assignment policy, which used race as a
factor.
But, as occurred in the Lynn case, Seattle
school officials have been granted a
rehearing, scheduled for next week, before a
larger panel of appeals court judges.
Louisville, Ky., school officials, meanwhile,
argued before the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals last week and are awaiting a ruling
on whether their voluntary plan is
constitutional.
Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas F.
Reilly, whose office had defended Lynn's
plan in court, said the voluntary system
works and "its goal is to prepare the children
of Lynn for the world they will live in and
work in."
The 14,300-student school system is 62
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percent minority, and many credit the
voluntary plan with striking a compromise
on integration that averted the racial tensions
that shattered Boston in the mid-1970s with
court-ordered busing. But in 1999, a group
of white, black, and Hispanic parents filed a
lawsuit asserting that the policy was
discriminatory.
Lynn's voluntary plan has not achieved
balance in all schools. About half of the
elementary schools and most middle schools
have reached district averages for racial
balance. The high schools are more diverse,
and students can more easily transfer from
one to the other, according to the court
ruling. But Lynn officials say most schools
are more diverse than they would have been
if the school system didn't use race as a
factor. Shoemaker Elementary School is 70
percent white, but would be almost all-white
without the plan.
Barbara George, Shoemaker's PTA
president, said she wanted her children to
grow up in a diverse school, even if her
neighborhood is largely white.
"I'm grateful for diversity," said George,
who is white. "It enhances my children's
experiences."
In last October's ruling against Lynn, the
judges said racial distinctions should always
be a last resort. They cited a 2003 decision
by the US Supreme Court that upheld the
University of Michigan's law school
admissions policy, ruling that universities
may use race as a factor, but not the sole
factor, in admissions to achieve a diverse
student body.
Yesterday's ruling upheld a 2003 decision by
US District Judge Nancy Gertner, who
found Lynn's plan was constitutional
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